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UNIVERSITY  OF CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY,  AND NBER 
The  U.S.  Fiscal  Problem:  Where 
We  Are,  How  We  Got  Here, 
and  Where  We're  Going 
1. Introduction 
In  fiscal  year  1992  the  U.S.  federal  budget  deficit  was  $290  billion 
dollars,  equal  to  nearly  5%  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  and 
contributing  to the continued  rapid growth  in the national  debt. By the 
end  of that fiscal year (on  September  30 of the calendar year), the ratio 
of publicly  held  national  debt to GDP had risen from a low  of 24.5% in 
1974 to 51.1%. 
To attack the  deficit, President  Clinton  proposed,  and  each  house  of 
Congress  barely  passed  in August,  the  Omnibus  Reconciliation  Act of 
1993 (OBRA 1993), an act that, according  to executive  branch estimates, 
will  raise  revenues  and  reduce  spending  by  a  total  of  roughly  $500 
billion over the five fiscal years from 1994 through  1998.1 
Was  this  action  necessary?  Was  it  enough?  Among  the  questions 
addressed  in this chapter are: 
* What is the current path of U.S. fiscal policy? 
* How  has  this  path  been  altered  (thus  far) by  the  Clinton  economic 
program? 
This chapter was prepared for the 1994 NBER  Macro Conference held in Cambridge, 
March 11-12, 1994.  I am grateful to Rosemary  Marcuss  for guidance in the use of CBO 
data, to her and V. V. Chari,  Martin  Feldstein,  Stan Fischer,  Tom Barthold,  Tom Bowne, 
David Romer,  and other participants  in the conference and in workshops at Penn and 
Berkeley  for comments  on earlier  drafts,  and to the National  Science  Foundation  (grant  # 
SBR90-22707)  and the Edward  Netter Research  Fund for financial  support. 
1. According  to the Office of Management  and Budget's 1993 Midsession  Review (OMB 
1993), the total is $504.8 billion, while the Congressional  Budget Office's  estimate is 
$432.9  billion (CBO,  1993b). 142 AUERBACH 
* Is the  current fiscal policy  trajectory sustainable,  and,  if not,  what  is 
the magnitude  of necessary  changes? 
These  questions  are central to the  fiscal policy  debate but difficult to 
answer.  To  identify  fiscal  policy's  current  trajectory,  we  must  make 
long-range  economic  projections  as well  as assumptions  regarding what 
current  policy  actually  is. Moreover,  we  must  know  how  to  interpret 
this information.  The budget  deficit can be defined  in a variety of ways 
and  there  is  nothing  to  ensure  that  one  year's  budget  deficit  will  be 
comparable  with  the  next,  or what  a  short-term  trend  in  the  budget 
deficit signifies  about the long-run  viability of fiscal policy.  Conclusions 
about the state of fiscal policy  should  not depend  on arbitrary account- 
ing  conventions  or  budget  "scoring"  rules.  Finally,  to  consider  the 
magnitude  of necessary  policy  changes,  we  must be able to gauge  how 
different policies  will  change  the  economy's  fiscal path. 
As discussed  later, the  uncertainties  involved  in each  of these  stages 
are considerable.  Fiscal performance  has proved  difficult to project with 
any  degree  of  accuracy;  budget  measures  are  rife  with  ambiguous 
concepts,  making  them  difficult to  interpret,  and  the  measurement  of 
economic  responses  to fiscal policies  has been  a source  of controversy. 
This leaves  those  who  would  design  policy  with  a daunting  task, the 
nature of which  is amply  illustrated by recent  events. 
The  politically  difficult  deficit  reduction  effort  of  1993  follows  an 
equally  painful  OBRA 1990, signed  after a protracted "budget  summit" 
by  a  president  who  had  made  a  campaign  commitment  to  "no  new 
taxes"  but  who  nevertheless  agreed  to  significant  revenue  increases 
along  with  spending  cuts,  again  estimated  at  the  time  to  total  about 
$500 billion  over  a five-year budget  period. 
With  recent  federal  budget  deficits  running  in  the  neighborhood  of 
$200-300  billion  per  year,  one  might  think  that  these  two  acts,  each 
apparently  reducing  the  deficit by  about  $100 billion  per  year, would 
have  led  us  close  to  budget  balance  in  the  ensuing  years.  Yet  the 
near-term outlook  is for continued  budget  deficits of nearly $200 billion 
dollars,  even  assuming  that  the  1990 Act's very  tight  caps  on  discre- 
tionary  spending,  which  keep  discretionary  spending  essentially  fixed 
in nominal  terms, are followed  through  fiscal year 1998. 
What's  going  on?  Another  of  this  chapter's  goals  is  to  find  out,  to 
address  the question,  "Why  have  large deficit reduction  policies  appar- 
ently  resulted  in so little deficit reduction?" 
Each of  the  difficulties  cited  earlier might  have  played  a role.  First, 
economic  responses  to  tax  increases  may  have  blunted  the  force  of 
these  deficit-reducing  policies.  Second,  "deficit reduction"  doesn't  nec- The  U.S.  Fiscal  Problem  ?  143 
essarily mean  deficit  reduction.  Budget  scoring rules measure  the effects 
of  legislation  on  the  deficit  relative  to  some  hypothetical  "baseline," 
which  is  intended  to  indicate  what  the  deficit  in  some  future  year 
would  have  been  had  no  policy  changes  been  adopted.  If the baseline 
forecasts project sharply increasing  deficits, then  even  significant "defi- 
cit reduction"  would  not  necessarily  result  in  reduced  deficits.  Third, 
we  may  simply  have  been  the  victims  of  forecasting  errors, expecting 
deficits to be lower  than they  turned  out to be. 
Identifying  the  reasons  for  the  recent  Sisyphean  fiscal  ordeal  has 
implications  for  future  policy  design.  Most  importantly,  the  recent 
success  or failure in forecasting  budget  trends  should  help  inform  our 
judgment  about  the  accuracy  of  current  forecasts  and  the  extent  to 
which  additional  policies  are needed  to achieve  long-run  fiscal viability. 
Studying  recent  fiscal  performance  can  also  help  us  understand  the 
effects of budget  accounting  rules and procedures.  Much of the federal 
government's  effort  at budget  control  during  the  past  decade,  begin- 
ning  with  the  Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  Emergency  Deficit  Control 
Act of 1985, has taken the form of procedural changes  intended  to place 
obstacles in the way  of deficit spending.  In light  of recent events,  I will 
consider  the  following  question,  "How  have  budget  control  rules  af- 
fected fiscal policy, and how  is the effectiveness  of such rules influenced 
by our ability to forecast future fiscal performance?" 
After a brief review  of recent current budget  trends, I turn in Section 
2 to a review  of the past decade  of budget  forecasts and results, in order 
to sort out the causes  of these  trends. Section  3 considers  the impact of 
deficit  control  measures  on  fiscal  policy,  in  light  of  recent  history. 
Section 4 describes the recent changes  in fiscal policy brought  about by 
the  1993  legislation.  In  Section  5,  I'll  return  to  the  paper's  initial 
question  of sustainability  and, in light  of all the  difficulties recognized, 
discuss  the  magnitude  of the  current fiscal imbalance  and  the  changes 
potentially  needed  to  produce  a  sustainable  fiscal  policy.  Section  6 
offers some  conclusions. 
1.1 RECENT  FISCAL  PERFORMANCE 
Figure  1 presents  annual  U.S. federal  budget  deficits  since  fiscal year 
1983, and  deficits projected  through  2004 by the  Congressional  Budget 
Office (CBO).2 As the  figure  indicates,  the  deficit  has  ranged  between 
$150  billion  and  $290  billion  throughout  the  historical  period,  and 
2.  Throughout  the rest of this paper, I will use  CBO forecasts except  as noted  otherwise. 
These  projections  do  not  incorporate  CBO's  recent  estimates  of  the  impact  of  the 
Clinton  health  proposals. 144 AUERBACH 
between  3% and  6% of GDP. Current projections  are for the  deficit to 
fall over the next couple  of years, both in nominal  dollars and as a share 
of GDP, then begin  rising again by both measures.  I'll discuss  later why 
the  deficit  is  projected  to  rise  and  the  extent  to  which  deficit  trends 
accurately represent  the path of fiscal policy.  First, however,  it is useful 
to consider  the factors that have contributed to the deficits, measured  as 
they  are, experienced  over the past decade. 
2. Identifying  the Sources  of Recent  Deficits 
As  indicated  earlier,  there  are  three  potential  explanations  for  the 
persistence  of  deficits  of  $200 billion  or more  in  the  face  of  the  large 
Figure 1 U.S. FEDERAL  BUDGET  DEFICITS  (ACTUAL  AND PROJECTED) 
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deficit  reduction  packages  passed  in  1990 and  1993: high  "baselines," 
unanticipated  behavioral  responses,  and  other  forecast  errors. I'll con- 
sider each of these  explanations.  Much  of my analysis will be based  on 
the historical record of CBO deficit forecast revisions. 
For several  years,  CBO has  published  forecasts  of  deficits, revenues, 
and  expenditures  for  the  current  and  five  subsequent  fiscal  years. 
Typically  twice  a year,  CBO has  provided  revised  estimates,  dividing 
the revisions  from one  forecast to the  next for a particular future  fiscal 
year  into  three  categories,  according  to  whether  they  could  be  at- 
tributed  to  changes  in  policy,  changes  in  projected  macroeconomic 
behavior,  or  those  residual,  or  "technical,"  changes  in  revenues  and 
spending  that  could  not  be  explained  either  by  policy  changes  or 
macroeconomic  changes.  Within  each  category,  revisions  are  broken 
into spending  and revenue  forecast revisions,  and  sometimes  further. 
For  example,  a  reduction  in  projected  tax  collections  due  to  an 
unexpected  recession  would  be classified as an economic  change,  while 
a  reduction  in  income  taxes  caused  by  a  shift  in  the  distribution  of 
taxable income  toward  lower  marginal  tax brackets would  count  as a 
technical  error,  because  the  income  distribution  is  not  part  of  the 
macroeconomic  forecast.  Policy  projections,  and  changes  in  them,  re- 
flect not  simply  actual legislation,  but a professional  judgment  of what 
is likely  to occur. This revision  process  may be expressed  as: 
t-iDt  t-i-Dt  +-Pt  + t-iEt  +-iTt,  (1) 
for i =  0 to 5, where  t_iDt  is the deficit forecast for year  t at the end  of 
year  t -  i (equal to the actual deficit  Dt for i =  0) and t_iPt, t_iEt, and 
t_iTt  are  the  policy,  economic,  and  technical  revisions  to  the  year  t 
deficit forecast in year  t -  i (denoted  Pt, Tt, and  Et when  i =  0). 
A similar procedure  has been  followed  by the  Office of Management 
and  Budget  (OMB), with  similar results,  at least  in  recent  years.  I use 
CBO figures  for two  reasons.  First, the  CBO methodology  is likely  to 
have been more consistent  over the past decade  than the corresponding 
OMB projections  of three different presidential  administrations.  Second, 
the CBO projections are likely to have been  closer to true forecasts than 
the OMB projections,  because  the latter were  often  distorted  by budget 
rules  requiring that projected  budget  deficits meet  certain targets.3 My 
3. Reischauer  (1990) provides evidence that the gap between OMB budget projections 
and CBO reestimates of  these budgets rose after the  enactment of  the  Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings  Act, which required  that budgets meet specified deficit  targets. 146- AUERBACH 
comments  should  not  be  taken  as  a  critique  of  CBO  methods  or 
competence.4 
2.1 INITIAL  BASELINES  AND THE  EFFECTS  OF POLICY 
To understand  why  deficits  remain  so  large,  it is  helpful  to  begin  by 
applying  expression  (1)  successively  for  a  given  fiscal  year's  deficit, 
cumulating  all the  revisions  that  occur  during  years  t -  5 through  t. 
This yields: 
5 
Dt =t-6Dt  +  E  (Pt-i  +  Et-i  +  Tt-i).  (2) 
i=0 
One  possible  reason  why  deficits remain so large is that initial baseline 
deficits  themselves-the  original  projections  t_6D  made  five  years 
prior to each  fiscal year in question-were  extremely  high.  This could 
have  come  about for two  reasons.  First, the excesses  of the past simply 
might have set policy  on a smooth  trajectory that, left to its own,  would 
have produced  ever higher  deficits. For example,  the Reagan tax cuts of 
1981  have  often  been  blamed  for  subsequent  deficits.  Alternatively, 
previous  policies  might  have  included  timing shifts in revenues  and/or 
expenditures  that reduced  near-term  deficits  at the  expense  of deficits 
beyond  the six-year forecasting period. For example,  a policy enacted  in 
1983 to  speed  up  revenue  collections  from 1990 to  1987 would  reduce 
the  1987 deficit but  lead  to  a higher  baseline  deficit  forecast  for  1990, 
when  the  initial  baseline  forecast  for that  fiscal year  first appeared  in 
1985. 
While offering different explanations  for why  the initial baseline  for a 
particular fiscal year might be high,  each argument  suggests  that policy 
changes  enacted  during the  six-year  forecasting  window  between  the 
date  of the  initial baseline  forecast and  the  end  of the  fiscal year itself 
simply  were  too  small to  offset  the  high  initial baseline  deficits.  How- 
ever, this story is not  consistent  with  the  data for recent  fiscal years or 
for those  in the immediate  future. 
There  have  been  several  policy  changes  aimed  at  reducing  deficits 
since  the  early  1980s,  in  addition  to  the  changes  of  1990  and  1993 
already cited. The importance  of these  intervening  changes  can be seen 
in Figure 2. This figure presents  two  series, based  on  data from Febru- 
4.  Indeed,  CBO (1993b, Appendix  A) provides  evidence  that its ex  post  macroeconomic 
forecasting  record, measured  in terms of root mean  squared errors in the prediction  of 
real GNP, inflation, and short-term interest rates, is comparable with  that of the private 
sector "blue  chip" consensus  and  somewhat  better than  the  combined  administration 
record. The U.S. Fiscal Problem ?  147 
ary 1983 to January 1994. The first, labeled  "Initial Baseline  Deficit," is 
the  deficit  for that year  as forecast by  CBO six years  earlier, t_6D,  or, 
for fiscal years prior to 1988, the deficit forecast in February 1983, which 
is  as  far back  as  the  data  go.  The  second  curve  in  Figure  2,  labeled 
"Baseline  Plus Policy," adjusts the initial deficit forecasts for the  effects 
of  all policy  changes  dating  from  the  first forecast  for each  fiscal year 
through  the  end  of  the  fiscal year  itself  or, for fiscal years  after  1993, 
through  January 1994. It corresponds  to the  right-hand  side  of expres- 
sion (2), with  the economic  and technical  revisions  set to zero, cumulat- 
ing  the  changes  in  deficit  forecasts  that  CBO attributed  to  changes  in 
policy,  from  the  date  at  which  calculations  for  that  fiscal year  began 
Figure 2 INITIAL  BASELINES  AND POLICY 
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until  the  end  of  that fiscal year or, for current and  future  fiscal years, 
until  January  1994. Thus,  a full  six  years'  estimated  policy  effects  are 
presented  only  for fiscal years 1988-1993. 
As  Figure  2  indicates,  fiscal  policies  since  1983  have,  according  to 
estimates,  reduced  budget  deficits  relative  to  initial  baseline  in  every 
fiscal year. For the fiscal years 1988-1993,  the average reduction  over six 
years was $154 billion. Some of these  reductions  may simply have  acted 
to offset the deficit increases embedded  in the initial baselines by earlier 
policy  actions.  Still, had  the  policy  effects  actually  measured  been  the 
only changes  from initial baseline  projections, the federal budget  would 
have  been  in  surplus  in  1991  and  1992  and  would  be  projected  in 
surplus  for fiscal years 1994 through  1996. 
Of course,  the  policies  themselves  would  probably have  been  differ- 
ent had there been  no  other (i.e., economic  and technical) revisions from 
initial baseline  forecasts during  this period.  That is, some  of the policies 
aimed at deficit reduction  resulted  from the realization that things were 
worse  than  originally  projected.  But this  argument  does  not  alter the 
conclusion  that the policies  actually enacted  were  estimated  to be large 
enough  to offset the budget  deficits initially projected. 
After fiscal year  1996, the  initial  baseline  deficits  rise  quite  sharply. 
For the  future,  then,  as I'll discuss  later, the  devil  may  well  be  in  the 
baselines  (or at least may  start there); but  for recent  years, we  need  to 
look  elsewhere. 
2.2 FORECAST  ERRORS 
The surpluses  indicated  by the  lower  curve  in Figure 2 were  exceeded 
by actual deficits (or those  projected  as of January 1994) by the  sum  of 
cumulative  economic  and  technical  forecast  errors. Figure  3  presents 
these  errors for the same period. Moving  vertically, the figure shows  the 
cumulative  impact  of,  respectively,  economic  errors, technical  errors, 
and the additional interest payments  associated with these two changes. 
These  interest  costs  include  the  effects (counted  as economic  changes) 
of revisions  in nominal  interest  rate forecasts, as well  as the cumulative 
debt service  effects resulting  from the economic  and technical  errors. 
There  are  two  reasons  to  consider  these  changes  in  interest  costs 
separately.  First, errors in the prediction  of debt service costs arise only 
as the  result  of  underlying  errors in  other  projections.  Second,  to  the 
extent  that  projected  nominal  interest  rates  and,  hence,  interest  costs 
change  because  of changes  in the expected  inflation rate, the associated 
change  in the projected  deficit is a change  in the nominal  deficit but not The U.S. Fiscal Problem  149 
Figure 3  FORECAST ERRORS 
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the real deficit.5 For fiscal years after 1995, declines  in projected nominal 
interest rates have  outweighed  increased  debt service projections,  caus- 
ing  revisions  of estimated  interest  costs to be slightly  negative  so far. 
5. Presumably,  there are other components of the economic forecast  error  attributable  to 
changes in  inflation expectations that we  would  also like to  exclude or consider 
separately for the same reason. However, at least in recent years, holding nominal 
interest rates fixed, "changes in inflation  have little impact on the deficit  because they 
tend to push up revenues and spending by roughly equal amounts."  (CBO, 1993b, 
p. 35). Hence, the net changes in the primary  deficit  (i.e., the deficit  excluding  interest) 
associated  with changes in macroeconomic  forecasts  should be due mainly to changes 
in real economic variables,  such as real growth and the unemployment rate. This will 
not be true, of course, for forecasts  of nominal revenues and spending, each of which 
will be quite sensitive to rate of inflation. 150  AUERBACH 
In studying  Figure 3, one  needs  to keep  in mind  that, as in Figure 2, 
only  the years 1988-1993  offer a full six years of data. Hence,  the  small 
errors in the early 1980s and late 1990s simply reflect the relatively  short 
intervals over which  errors are being  cumulated.  Focusing  again on the 
period  from  1988  to  1993,  then,  we  observe  that  both  technical  and 
economic  forecast errors have been  positive  in every  one  of these  fiscal 
years.  Further, both  economic  and,  particularly,  technical  errors have 
been  very large in recent fiscal years. For fiscal years 1990-1993,  techni- 
cal errors alone  (excluding  interest)  accounted  for an  average  of  $132 
billion  per  year.  Even  more  disturbing  is  the  fact that  for fiscal years 
1994-1996,  for which  fewer than six years' revisions  have been  counted, 
the average  technical  error equals $166 billion.6 
2.3 DECOMPOSING  TECHNICAL  FORECAST  ERRORS 
These  large  technical  prediction  errors  deserve  further  attention  for 
several  reasons.  First of  all, unlike  economic  forecast  errors, which  by 
definition  are directly  attributable to changes  in the  forecasts of aggre- 
gate  variables,  these  are  the  residuals  of  the  forecasting  process  and, 
therefore, not directly linked  to any aggregate  changes.  Their causes are 
not  as  easily  identified  and  could  have  different  implications  for  the 
future.  Second,  economic  forecast  errors may  present  less  reason  for 
concern  or policy  reaction, because  they  reflect, in part, the  automatic 
stabilizers  that,  at  least  from  a  traditional  Keynesian  perspective,  are 
desirable.  On  the  other  hand,  there  need  be no  obvious  benefit  associ- 
ated with  forecast errors, conditional  on the  state of the economy. 
Finally, to the  extent  that recent deficits have been  caused by inaccu- 
rate assessments  of taxpayer responses  to tax changes,  we  would  expect 
this to show  up  in technical  forecast errors of tax revenues.  For exam- 
ple, suppose  an increase in capital gains tax rates reduced  capital gains 
realizations  more than CBO predicted.  This would  reduce  capital gains 
realizations,  given  the level  of income  and other macroeconomic  aggre- 
gates  and,  therefore,  would  lead  to overestimates  of individual  income 
tax collections,  conditional  on  macroeconomic  conditions,  in  the  years 
following  the  enactment  of the tax increase. 
Perhaps the biggest  single source of technical forecasting error during 
the past decade  was  the savings  and loan (S &L) bail-out and associated 
problems.  There  was,  initially,  an  underprediction  of  the  cost  of  the 
6. The cumulative  forecast error for fiscal year 1998 is negative,  in contrast to the general 
trend.  This  reflects  one  year's  revision  (from  January 1993 to  January  1994), during 
which  technical  and  economic  forecast errors for fiscal years  1994-1997  were  negative 
as well.  Whether  these  very  recent  revisions  indicate  a  shift  in  the  trends  of  recent 
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bail-out,  leading  to  large  forecast  errors in  the  early  1990s. Thereafter, 
there  was  uncertainty  regarding  when  Congress  would  choose  to pro- 
vide  the  funds  already  seen  as needed,  essentially  a timing  issue  that 
has  led  to both  positive  and  negative  technical  forecast  errors in fiscal 
years after 1992. 
However,  the  S&L bail-out  explains  only  a small part of the  overall 
picture.  Figure  4  graphs  the  cumulative  technical  forecast  errors  for 
fiscal  years  1983-1998  shown  in  Figure  3,  but  excluding  both  the 
associated  debt  service  and  the  errors attributable to the  S&L bail-out. 
Figure  4 breaks  the  remaining  forecast  errors into  three  components: 
revenue  overpredictions,  underpredictions  in the  cost of Medicare  and 
Medicaid,  and  all others. 
Figure 4 TECHNICAL  ERRORS 
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The  rapid  growth  of  medical  spending  in  recent  years  has  (until 
calendar  year  1993) been  underpredicted  consistently,  leading  to  the 
technical  errors associated  with  the  Medicare  and  Medicaid  programs. 
While  these  errors have  been  important,  Figure 4 shows  that revenue 
overpredictions  have  been  an even  more significant  source  of technical 
forecast  errors in  recent  years.  However,  even  with  these  two  areas 
(plus  those  already  excluded)  accounted  for,  a  significant 
residual-around  $70 billion  in fiscal years 1993 and  1994-remains. 
Although  a relatively  short period  of time is represented  in Figure 4, 
this  persistence  of  large  positive  cumulative  technical  errors calls into 
question  whether  these  are true  forecast  errors in  terms  of being  the 
results of an optimal  forecasting  process. 
One  possibility  is  that  technical  errors  are  systematically  positive 
because  baseline  forecasts  fail to  account  for the  "unexpected"  emer- 
gencies  that always  arise, in the way  that a local government  might not 
"expect"  snow  and,  hence,  fail  to  provide  a  snow  removal  budget. 
Aside  from the  S&L bail-out, which  is already excluded  from Figure 4, 
recent years have seen hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, Operation Desert 
Storm,  etc.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  also  experienced  an  unpre- 
dictably rapid decline  in defense  spending  (the "peace  dividend")  due 
to  the  deterioration  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  now  Russia as a military 
threat, which  has led to negative  technical  forecast errors. 
Moreover,  unlike  in  the  snow  removal  example,  these  are  deficit 
forecasts. They are not the actual budgets  presented  by presidents  who 
have  been  accused  of  adopting  a "rosy  scenario"  in  order  to  put  off 
proposing  difficult budget  choices,  and  who  have  been  given  further 
incentive  to do  so by budget  rules requiring that submitted budgets  be 
claimed  to  satisfy  certain  criteria (see  footnote  3). There  undoubtedly 
has been  political pressure  not to forecast realistically large deficits, but 
it is difficult to know  how  important  a role such pressure has played  in 
producing  the  forecasting  record observed  during  the past decade. 
2.4 THE  STATISTICAL  PROPERTIES  OF REVENUE 
FORECAST  ERRORS 
Whatever  the  importance  of  the  "one  unexpected  emergency  after 
another"  hypothesis  on  the  spending  side,  it  is  difficult  to  think  of 
comparable  examples  on  the  revenue  side,  given  that these  errors are 
residuals  after  account  has  been  taken  of  macroeconomic  and  policy 
effects. Further, while  CBO provides  a breakdown  of spending  forecast 
errors by  source  (defense,  medical,  etc.),  there  is  usually  no  explicit 
breakdown  given  for revenues. 
In the aggregate,  though,  these  revenue  forecast errors have typically 
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Table  1  REVENUE  FORECAST  REVISIONS,  1983-1993 
Years  ahead  Policy  Economic  Technical 
0  3.8  -11.9  -4.6 
1  10.0  -  15.2  -6.5 
2  11.0  -15.7  -6.7 
3  14.9  -  17.6  -7.6 
4  17.9  -20.7  -7.2 
5  9.5  -7.2  -2.9 
Total  67.9  -88.3  -  35.5 
Source:  CBO and author's calculations. 
for  each  fiscal year,  but  for  each  individual  revision  as  well.  Table  1 
presents  the average  k-year-ahead forecast revisions  during  the sample 
period,  for  k  ranging  from  0 (the  current  fiscal year)  to  5 (the  most 
distant  fiscal year being  predicted).  For each  value  of  k, average  eco- 
nomic  and  technical  revisions  are  negative,  and  policy  revisions  are 
positive.7  Presumably,  the  economic  revisions  are attributable to unex- 
pectedly  weak  growth  and  lower  inflation  after the  mid-1980s,  while 
the  policy  revisions  simply  reflect the  continual  process  of attempts  at 
deficit reduction. 
Whence  the  technical  errors? As  a first step  toward  answering  this 
question,  Table  2  presents  the  results  of  regressions  in  which  each 
technical  revision  for  each  fiscal year  is  represented  as  an  individual 
observation.  Explanatory  variables  in  the  first  specification  include  a 
constant  and  lagged  values  of the  three  forecast revisions  for the  same 
fiscal year. 
As the  first column  of  Table 2 shows,  technical  revisions  are essen- 
tially unpredictable  using  this information-the  equation's  R2 is  -.01, 
and no variable has a statistically significant impact. However,  adding  a 
simple time trend to the regression  explains one-third  of the variance of 
the  technical  forecast  errors.  In  this  second  specification,  the  tech- 
nical  error, aside  from  trending  sharply  downward  over  time,  relates 
negatively  to  all  three  components  of  the  lagged  forecast  revision, 
7.  These calculations are based on the evidence  through  fiscal year 1993. The revisions  are 
smaller,  on  average,  for  the  five-year-ahead  estimates  because  these  typically  reflect 
only  a partial year's information.  The first forecast for the fiscal year five years into the 
future  is typically  published  in January, whereas  the  fiscal year begins  on  October  1. 
For example,  CBO's first published  estimate  for fiscal year  1998 appeared  in January 
1993. Hence,  the five-year-ahead  revision  for fiscal year 1998 reflects changes  only from 
January 1993 through  late September  1993. The fiscal-year-1993 revisions  of projected 
deficits in fiscal years 1993-1997  (zero through  four years ahead) include  revisions  from 
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Table 2  EXPLAINING TECHNICAL REVENUE FORECAST  REVISIONS 
Specification 
(1)  (2) 
Independent  variable 
Constant  -4.21  10.94 
(-1.54)  (2.56) 
Dependent  variable, lagged  0.28  -0.61 
(1.84)  (-2.83) 
Policy revision, lagged  -  0.01  -0.12 
(-0.09)  (-1.39) 
Economic revision, lagged  0.04  -0.13 
(0.73)  (-2.03) 
Time trend  -  -4.50 
(1985 =  1)  (-4.22) 
R2  -.01  .31 
Number of observations: 45 
Note: t statistics  (incorporating  the  White  [1980] standard  error correction)  are in  parentheses. 
suggesting  that revisions  are systematically  too  large in absolute  value. 
Interestingly,  though,  the  one  such  relationship  that  would  have  the 
most  straightforward  explanation-the  overstatement  of  revenues  at- 
tributable  to  policy  changes  because  of  an  underprediction  of  the 
magnitude  of  behavioral  effects-is  the  least  significant,  both  statisti- 
cally and  quantitatively. 
What can we  conclude  from this exercise? First, technical  errors seem 
clearly  not  to  be  optimal  forecast  errors in  the  sense  of  being  drawn 
from  a  distribution  having  zero  mean  and  independent  of  available 
information.  On  average,  they  are significantly  negative  and  related  to 
past information.  Second,  at least in the  aggregate,  underprediction  of 
behavioral  responses  to taxation does  not seem to have played  a crucial 
role  in  producing  the  consistent  overprediction  of  revenues.8  Finally, 
the  errors themselves  have  been  getting  worse  over  time.  While  it  is 
implausible  that such  a trend could  continue  for very  long  (and  recent 
8. This finding does not demonstrate  that behavioral  effects have been accurately  pre- 
dicted in all instances,  or that potential  prediction  errors  are not an important  factor  in 
evaluating future policy. Rather,  it simply indicates that there is much more to the 
historical  puzzle. Indeed, an important  component of CBO's  forecasting  errors  follow- 
ing the Tax Reform  Act of 1986 can be attributed  to overestimated  capital gains tax 
realizations.  Also after 1986,  individual  income tax revenues rose more than originally 
predicted, which some (e.g., Feenberg and Poterba, 1993; Feldstein, 1993) have at- 
tributed  to the behavioral  response of high-income  taxpayers.  However, this is masked 
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evidence  encourages  the  hope  that it may be  ending),  one  still is led, 
pending  a better understanding  of the  process,  to be  concerned  about 
what  revisions  lie in store and to be skeptical of any conclusions  about 
the sustainability of fiscal policy based on point estimates of revenues  or 
expenditures.  I  will  return  to  this  issue  later  when  evaluating  the 
current state of policy  and recent fiscal changes. 
3. Budget  Rules  and Their  Impact  on Policy 
Since the  advent  of large federal budget  deficits in the  early 1980s, the 
federal  government  has  relied  on  a succession  of budget  control  mea- 
sures in its attempts to achieve  fiscal balance. Recently, despite  the 1993 
extension  of the  provisions  of the  1990 Budget  Enforcement  Act, there 
have  been  renewed  calls for an even  stronger measure,  i.e., a balanced 
budget  amendment. 
Presumably, budget  rules are imposed  by legislators (and presidents) 
to  force  themselves  to  accept  more  fiscal  austerity  than  they  would 
agree  to  in  the  normal  course  of  events.  The  notion  is  that  while  a 
majority  of  legislators  may  agree  on  the  need  for  overall  limits,  the 
legislative  process  fails to produce  a majority coalition  in opposition  to 
any particular deficit-increasing  provision.  While the  political economy 
of  this  process  is  not  particularly  well  understood  and,  thus,  merits 
further  attention,9  I will  confine  my  discussion  to  how  well  the  rules 
have been  designed  to achieve  their apparent objective. The persistence 
of significant  deficits throughout  the  past decade  suggests  the  absence 
of complete  victory,  to say the least. 
This section  describes the different budget  control measures that have 
been  used  since the mid-1980s and considers  the impact that they  have 
had on fiscal policy.  It also draws out the implications  for the design  of 
such measures  of two important factors. One is the difficulty of making 
accurate budget  predictions,  which  was  discussed  in the  previous  sec- 
tion. The other, which  is illustrated later, is the demonstrated  ability of 
government  to  alter  the  timing  of  measured  deficits  with  minimal 
changes  in the  underlying  fiscal policy  itself.  Each of these  factors has 
confounded  past  budget  control  mechanisms  and,  indeed,  led  to  per- 
verse  results. 
3.1 BUDGET  RULES 
The  first attempt  at  imposing  an  external  mechanism  to  control  the 
budget  deficit was  the Balanced Budget  and Emergency  Control Act of 
9.  See Gramlich (1990) for some  further discussion  along  these  lines. 156. AUERBACH 
1985, commonly  known  as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  (GRH). Enacted 
in  December  1985,  it  imposed  specific  deficit  targets  for  fiscal  years 
beginning  in  the  same  fiscal year  (1986), declining  linearly  to  zero  by 
fiscal year  1991. If, at the  beginning  of a fiscal year, the  target for that 
year  was  judged  by  OMB not  approximately  to  have  been  met,  auto- 
matic, across-the-board budget  cuts (sequestration)  would  follow.  Once 
the  target  was  declared  met  for  a  particular  fiscal  year,  subsequent 
forecast revisions  during the remainder of that fiscal year were  ignored. 
Failure to  meet  the  original  GRH targets  for fiscal year  1988 led  to 
amended  targets in 1987, declining  to zero by fiscal year 1993. Failure to 
meet  the  revised  targets  led  ultimately  to  the  supplanting  of  GRH by 
the  1990 Budget  Enforcement  Act (BEA). Under  BEA, there  are specific 
caps on discretionary  spending  that translate into real annual  spending 
reductions,  along  with  a Pay-as-You-Go (PAYGO) process  for revenues 
and entitlements  (excluding  Social Security, which  is treated  separately 
and in similar fashion)  that prohibits policy changes  from increasing  the 
estimated  deficit  in  any  year  during the  six-year  period  (covering  the 
current and  five  subsequent  fiscal years)  for which  official deficit fore- 
casts are made. 
Unlike  GRH, BEA effectively  imposes  no  deficit  targets-only  the 
requirement  that any  year's policy  changes  not  increase  the  estimated 
current  and  near-term  deficits  relative  to  the  levels  forecast  at  the 
beginning  of  the  current  fiscal year.  For example,  policy  changes  en- 
acted during fiscal year 1992 could not increase the estimated  deficits in 
any of the fiscal years from 1992 through  1997 over the levels  predicted 
for these  deficits at the beginning  of fiscal year 1992. 
3.2 THE  IMPACT  OF FORECAST  ERRORS 
The large forecast errors discussed  in the  previous  section  clearly have 
confounded  the  operation  of GRH and  BEA in reducing  deficits. Con- 
sider first the impact under  GRH. The GRH budget  rule can be written 
Pt <  Dg  -t-lDt,  (3) 
where  D*  is the deficit target for year  t. Given that the actual deficit in 
year  t, Dt, equals the previous  year's estimate plus economic,  technical, 
and policy  revisions, 
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it follows  that, if Equation (3) is just satisfied, then 
Dt =  D  +  T+  E.  (5) 
That is, the  GRH target for year  t  is missed  by  the  extent  of technical 
and economic  forecast errors.'0 
Under  BEA, the deficit policy  rule is much  simpler, i.e., 
t-iPt  <  0,  (6) 
for  i =  0 to 5. If this condition  is satisfied by equality,  then  expression 
(2) becomes: 
5 
Dt  =-t_6Dt  +  (Et-i  +  Tt-i)  (7) 
i=0 
Thus,  the  BEA rule incorporates  the  cumulative  effect of the  full six 
years'  prediction  errors of  a fiscal year's  deficit, rather than just  those 
occurring  in  the  fiscal  year  itself.  Even  if  each  individual  prediction 
error were  unbiased,  this cumulation  would  increase  the magnitude  of 
deviations."  But  the  sample  mean  of  $123.8  billion  in  cumulative 
economic  and technical forecast errors for a typical fiscal year (see Table 
1) implies  that the rule also systematically  has led to a deficit exceeding 
the  initial  baseline  forecast  by  this  amount.  Moreover,  in  comparing 
Equations (5) and (7), it is important  to realize  that there is nothing  to 
suggest  that the initial baseline  forecast bears any relation to an optimal 
deficit  target. Thus, in practice, the  BEA validates  deficits  substantially 
higher  than those  initially forecast, which  may themselves  be viewed  as 
far too  high.  Indeed,  one  reason  for their being  too  high  is that policy 
actions  prior to the  date of initial forecast may have  shifted  the  timing 
of deficits from earlier years. 
3.3 THE  TIMING  OF DEFICIT  REDUCTIONS 
In addition  to impounding  forecast errors in the eventual  deficits, both 
GRH and BEA provided  policymakers  seeking  to avoid  the austerity  of 
"permanent"  deficit reduction  with  the  incentive  and  the  opportunity 
10.  While  there  might  be  stabilization  arguments  for not  offsetting  some  components  of 
the economic  forecast errors, the same argument  presumably would  call for a simulta- 
neous  adjustment  to future years' targets as their economic  forecasts were  revised  in 
year  t. 
11.  This follows  directly from the fact that the optimal forecast errors of the year  t deficit 
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to  alter  the  timing  of  revenues  and  expenditures  without  necessarily 
affecting  their long-run  levels  or even  their present  values. 
Under  GRH, a particular fiscal year's  deficit  target  could  be  met  by 
increasing  deficits in subsequent  years. The classic mechanism  for doing 
so was  the  sale of government  assets  that, in the  most  straightforward 
case, would  reduce  a current year's  deficit and  increase  the  deficits  of 
remaining  years  by  an  amount  equal  in  present  value.  According  to 
Reischauer (1990), fully half of the deficit reduction  under  GRH fell into 
the  "one-time  savings"  category  including  asset  sales  and  moving 
agencies  off budget. 
Some  have  argued  that this use  of "smoke  and  mirrors" could  have 
been  curtailed through  better budget  rule design.  For example, a capital 
budget  would  have  eliminated  the  deficit  impact  of  pure  asset  sale 
transactions.  However,  there  were  many  "legitimate"  fiscal  changes 
during  this  period,  not  generally  criticized  as  "budget  gimmicks," 
which  had  the same timing  effects. An example  is the provisions  of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 that repealed  the investment  tax credit immedi- 
ately  and  retroactively  and  partially compensated  for this  tax increase 
by reducing  the corporate tax rate.l2 This illustrates the futility of trying 
to distinguish  between  "good"  and "bad" budget  changes  in an annual 
context. 
The  experience  under  GRH  led  to  the  BEA's  use  of  a  multiyear 
approach.  However,  even  under  the  BEA, incentives  for  shifting  re- 
main.  Now,  they  simply  must  occur  from  fiscal  years  beyond  the 
six-year  budget  window  over  which  the  restrictions  on  policy  apply. 
However,  because  the  shifting  of deficits would  be made  only  to those 
budget  years for which  an official deficit forecast has yet  to be made,  it 
is impossible  to identify  such  shifting  from the  policy  changes  actually 
recorded.  These  shifts  of  deficits  to  "outside  the  budget  window" 
would  ultimately  show  up  indirectly  through  unusually  high  initial 
deficit forecasts for those  future fiscal years. 
The  fact  that  the  restrictions  that  the  BEA places  in  the  future  are 
then  based  on  these  initial baseline  deficits leads  to the  perverse  result 
(not present  under  GRH, which  relied on predetermined  deficit targets) 
that policies  that decrease  current deficits at the expense  of future ones 
12.  Since the investment  tax credit (ITC) reduces  taxes on investments  when  they  occur, 
while  a corporate tax cut reduces  taxes on investments  over time, a policy of reducing 
the  ITC and  the  corporate  tax at the  same  time, keeping  the  present  value  of taxes 
collected  from each new  investment  constant,  accelerates the tax collections  from new 
investment.  The provisions  of the  1986 Act were  somewhat  more complicated  in that 
they  repealed  the  ITC retroactively  and  extended  the  corporate  tax  reduction  to 
existing  assets. The  U.S.  Fiscal  Problem  ?  159 
are then sustained  by the budget  rules once those future years enter the 
budget  window. 
For  example,  the  current  budget  window  includes  fiscal  years 
1994-1999.  A  tax  speedup  enacted  this  year  from  fiscal  year  2000  to 
fiscal year 1999 might be used  to raise enough  revenue  in 1999 to offset 
some  other  deficit-increasing  policy  of  equal  magnitude  in  the  same 
fiscal year. As a result, the combined  policy  would  cause no net change 
in the  estimated  fiscal year  1999 deficit and  an increase  in the baseline 
deficit for fiscal year 2000, when  initially reported. The BEA rules would 
then  be  based  on  this  initial  forecast  and  thereby  would  sustain  the 
previous  year's deficit-increasing  policy.  Indeed,  if the  collection  of all 
the  income  taxes  from fiscal year  2000 were  speeded  up  to  fiscal year 
1999, the  initial  baseline  deficit  for  fiscal year  2000  would  reflect  the 
absence  of any income  tax collections. 
How  much  shifting  has  occurred  under  the  different  budget  rules? 
We cannot  observe  the magnitude  of shifts under  BEA, for they  would 
occur  from  future  years  fo1 which  estimates  have  not  generally  been 
available. Within the six-year budget  window,  we  can only  observe  the 
shifts induced  by GRH, which  would  take the form of deficit reductions 
in  the  current  fiscal year  achieved  at  the  cost  of  increased  deficits  in 
subsequent  fiscal years. 
Figure 5 presents  the pattern of deficit reduction  (excluding  interest) 
during three regimes: pre-GRH, GRH, and BEA. For each of these  eras, I 
have  aggregated  the policy  changes,  in each case recording  the impact 
of  the  change  on  the  current  year's  deficit  and  those  of  the  five 
subsequent  fiscal years. In terms of the notation  introduced  earlier, the 
policy  changes  along  each  curve  are the  average  values  of  Pt,  tPt+1, 
tPt+2,  tPt+3, tPt+4, and  tPt+5 during  the  regime,  expressed  in terms of 
deficit  reduction (i.e.,  in  negative  terms)  and  as  a  percentage  of  the 
total.13 
The  incentives  under  GRH for  shifting  into  the  current  fiscal year 
suggest  that  a  greater  share  of  such  deficit  reduction  would  occur 
during  the  current  fiscal year  under  GRH than  before  GRH. On  the 
other  hand,  BEA's restrictions  on  shifting  from  any  of  the  next  five 
years would,  if anything,  make shifting from these fiscal years less likely 
even  than before GRH, when  no explicit restrictions on shifting  existed. 
Indeed,  Figure 5 bears these  predictions  out. Before GRH, the average 
policy  change  involved  an  increase  in  the  current  year's  deficit  and 
reductions  in  the  deficits  of  the  next  five  years.  Under  GRH, enacted 
13.  Because  of  the  difficulty  of  classification,  I have  omitted  the  changes  that  occurred 
contemporaneously  with  the enactment  of both  GRH and BEA. 160 AUERBACH 
Figure 5 DEFICIT  REDUCTION  PATTERNS 














Source: CBO  and  author's  calculations. 
policies  had  little effect  on  the  deficit five years  out but  a considerable 
impact on  the  current year's deficit. Under  BEA, we  have  reverted  to a 
situation  in  which  the  average  impact  of  policy  is  to  increase  the 
current  year's  deficit,14 but  the  pattern  of  deficit  reduction  is  shifted 
even  more toward  the later years of the  sample  than before  GRH. In a 
sense,  the  adoption  of  the  BEA has  succeeded  in  eliminating  timing 
shifts  within the budget  window.  But this change  does  not indicate  the 
14. These  deficit increases  are possible,  given  the restrictions against  enacting  a policy  to 
increase  the  deficit, because  of various  loopholes  in  the  rules,  such  as the  ability to 
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absence  of shifts from fiscal years more than  five years into  the  future, 
and  it could  be  one  explanation  for why  the  initial baselines  jumped 
suddenly  in fiscal year 1997, the first initial baseline  to appear after the 
adoption  of the new  budget  rules (see  Figure 2). 
3.4 SUMMARY 
The budget  rules  of  the  past  decade  have  not  succeeded  in  achieving 
sustained  deficit  reduction.  The  "budget  gimmicks"  and  unrealistic 
deficit targets  of GRH gave  way  to the  less  ambitious but longer-hori- 
zon  constraints  of the BEA. However,  the BEA still permits policies  that 
shift  deficits  "outside  the  budget  window"  and  sustains  these  policies 
by  relying  on  initial  baseline  estimates  rather  than  budget  targets. 
Moreover,  it provides  no  error-correction mechanism  to  deal  with  the 
six years  of forecast  errors that occur after a fiscal year's  deficit is first 
officially forecast. 
These  incentives  to  shift  deficits  from  one  year  to  another  have 
translated into  policy  actions, as measured  by patterns of deficit reduc- 
tion  within  the  six-year budget  window.  Much  of these  shifts resulted 
from "legitimate"  budget  changes  not  viewed  as budget  "gimmicks," 
illustrating one  of the weaknesses  of budget  control measures based  on 
annual  or  multiyear  deficits  rather  than  on  long-run  fiscal  conse- 
quences.  Under  BEA, though,  the  full  impact  is  difficult  to  ascertain 
precisely  because  the  increased  deficits are beyond  the  official forecast 
horizon. 
4. OBRA  1993 and its Medium-Run  Effects 
The  Clinton  program  enacted  in  OBRA 1993 was  the  first important 
change  in fiscal policy  since  the  1990 budget  agreement.  As the  intro- 
duction  indicated,  the  legislation  was  estimated  to  have  provided  as 
much  as  $500  billion  in  deficit  reduction  over  the  five  fiscal  years 
between  1994 and 1998. It includes  a variety of tax increases, reductions 
in  the  level  of  discretionary  spending,  and  reductions  in  spending  on 
entitlements,  particularly Medicare. 
4.1 SOURCES  OF SHORT-TERM  DEFICIT  REDUCTION 
Before  one  considers  the  long-run  impact  of  the  Clinton  plan,  it  is 
important  to  ask  how  realistic  its  projected  savings  are,  even  in  the 
short run.  Put another  way,  how  likely  is it that the  recent  pattern  of 
upward  forecast revisions  of deficits continue. 
On the revenue  side, there has been  the critique, already cited earlier, 
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top  individual  marginal  tax rates. For example,  Feldstein  (1993) argues 
that  virtually  no  net  revenue  will  be  collected  as  a  result  of  the  tax 
increase, representing  a gap of over $20 billion per year at 1993 income 
levels  relative  to  estimates  ignoring  any  behavioral  effects.15 His  esti- 
mates are based  on the responsiveness  of taxpayers to the marginal tax 
rate reductions  of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Given the relatively  small overall labor supply  and savings  elasticities 
typically  found  in  the  empirical  literature,  how  can  Feldstein's  esti- 
mated  revenue  effects be justified? There are two  main arguments, both 
based  on the fact that the  1993 tax changes  are highly  progressive. 
First, absent any behavioral effects, a progressive  tax change  will raise 
less  revenue  from  affected  taxpayers  than  would  a  proportional  tax 
change  on  the  same  group  that  produced  the  same  increase  in  their 
marginal  tax  rate,  since  the  average  tax  rate  will  rise  less  than  the 
marginal tax rate. But the policies  will have  the same substitution  effect 
on  behavior.  Hence,  if  the  two  policies  lead  to  the  same  behavioral 
reduction  in before-tax  income,  the  associated  percentage  reduction  in 
the revenue  gain will be larger under  the progressive  tax increase. This 
is just  another  way  of  saying  that  the  deadweight  loss  of  progressive 
taxation is greater than that of proportional  taxation. 
In addition,  the  implied  behavioral  responses  of  taxpayers,  particu- 
larly those  in  the  highest  income  classes,  to  the  198116 as well  as  the 
1986 reductions  in marginal  tax rates, are much  larger than  would  be 
implied  by labor supply  and  savings  elasticities.  The usual  explanation 
is that much  of the taxpayer response  took the form of income  shifting 
from tax-favored  to fully taxable (and  observed)  categories,  rather than 
changes  in underlying  work  and  saving  behavior. 
Is behavior  after the  1986 Act a good  predictor  of what  will  happen 
after the  1993 Act? Given  the many  other provisions  contained  in each 
piece  of  legislation,  and  other  economic  changes  that  have  occurred 
simultaneously,  it is extremely  hard  to know.  There  are differences  in 
the  two  pieces  of  legislation  that  could  push  the  results  in  either 
direction. For example,  some of the increase in taxable income  in higher 
income  classes  after the  1986 Act undoubtedly  resulted  from  the  act's 
restrictions on tax shelter activity, which  were  not reversed by the 1993 
Act. On  the  other  hand,  because  the  1993 Act is very  progressive,  its 
income  effects  on  labor  supply  and  saving  behavior  are  likely  to  be 
smaller relative  to  its  substitution  effects,  compared  with  those  of  the 
15.  The CBO projections, based on revenue  estimates produced  by the Joint Tax Commit- 
tee,  presumably  incorporate  some  assumed  behavioral  changes,  but  they  are clearly 
smaller than  those  for which  Feldstein  argues. 
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1986 Act. As  long  as  leisure  and  consumption  are normal  goods,  this 
would  lead to greater behavioral  responses,  given  the marginal tax rate 
changes,  than occurred after the  1986 Act. 
In  summary,  it  is  difficult  to  know  whether  we  will  observe  large 
"technical"  adjustments  to revenue  forecasts over the next few years as 
a result of the assumptions  underlying  present projections. There is also 
the  question  of  whether  any  large  behavioral  changes  that  do  occur 
represent  permanent  changes,  or simply  temporary  ones.17 
While OBRA 1993's projected  revenue  increases  derive  from changes 
in specific tax rules, some  of the  estimated  spending  reductions  simply 
reflect the legislation's  changes  in the targets for future spending  levels, 
which  both  CBO  and  OMB  have  chosen  to  incorporate  into  their 
baseline  forecasts.  Foremost  among  these-and  representing  about  a 
third  of  the  estimated  noninterest  deficit  reduction  by  1998-is  the 
"hard freeze" in overall discretionary spending  that would  keep  discre- 
tionary  spending  roughly  constant  in  nominal  terms  between  fiscal 
years  1993 and  1998-representing  a drop  of  roughly  2% of  GDP, or 
about a 22% cut in the level  of discretionary  spending  relative to what 
would  prevail if such spending  remained  at its 1993 share of GDP. 
4.2 TIMING  AND DEFICITS  BEYOND  1998 
The  previous  discussion  dealt  with  the  extent  to  which  the  estimated 
effects  of OBRA 1993 on  near-term budget  deficits is plausible.  Even  if 
these  estimates  are accurate, a second  question  is the  extent  to  which 
such  deficit reductions  help  address  the federal government's  long-run 
fiscal problems,  as opposed  simply  to reducing  deficits  temporarily  or 
shifting  deficits  to fiscal years beyond  1998 that lie beyond  the  official 
budget  forecasting  horizon. 
Because  much  of  OBRA  1993's  estimated  deficit  reduction  on  the 
spending  side simply takes the form of reduced  spending  targets, rather 
than  specific reductions,  it is difficult to identify  the  longer-run  effects 
of the legislation  on spending.  On the revenue  side, though,  it is easy to 
identify  specific  provisions  of  the  legislation  that  do  not  increase  rev- 
enues  beyond  1998 as much  as they  do  during  the  budget  period,  or 
lose  more revenue  after 1998 than they  do during  the budget  period. 
For example,  both  corporate and  individual  estimated  tax provisions 
have been  tightened,  leading  to a one-time  speedup  in the timing of tax 
collections  as a greater share of  each  year's tax payments  are made  in 
17.  Feenberg  and  Poterba  (1993)  provide  evidence  that  the  surge  of  reported  income 
among  high-income  taxpayers occurred largely in 1987 and 1988 and actually receded 
in 1989. This is relevant  to the results Feldstein  presents,  which  compare the behavior 
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advance.  Securities  dealers  holding  appreciated  securities  in inventory 
must move  from a cash basis to an accrual basis in paying  tax on these 
gains,  again  a one-time  speedup  of  revenue  collections.  The  tax treat- 
ment  of intangible  assets was altered in a way  that raised more revenue 
during the budget  period than afterward, when  it may well  lose several 
billion  dollars  per  year.18 These  four  revenue  provisions  alone  have 
been  estimated  by the U.S. Joint Committee  on Taxation (1993) to raise 
approximately  $14.8 billion  over  the  period  1994-1998.  The small busi- 
ness  capital gains  tax cut, one  of the  key  tax incentives  of the  Clinton 
program,  loses  less  than  a billion  dollars  over  the  five  years  through 
1998-because  stock  must  be  held  for  at  least  five  years  after  the 
effective  date to qualify for the 50% capital gains tax exclusion.  Presum- 
ably,  once  the  five-year  waiting  period  is  over,  the  revenue  loss  will 
burgeon.l9 And, while  the extension  of the low-income  housing  credit is 
projected to lose $4.9 billion between  1994 and 1998, its annual cost will 
reach  much  higher  levels  in  the  years  that  follow  because  more  and 
more vintages  of housing  will be receiving  this multiyear credit simulta- 
neously. 
How  much impact do these  and other such provisions  have on future 
deficits? As  discussed  earlier, official forecasts  of  the  impact  of  OBRA 
1993 in fiscal years beyond  1998 do not exist. However,  an estimate  can 
be  made  using  the  overall,  "unofficial"  10-year budget  forecasts  that 
CBO  recently  has  begun  publishing.  While  CBO  does  not  explicitly 
identify  how  much  of  the  revisions  in  these  forecasts  over  time  are 
attributable to economic,  technical, and policy changes,  a rough division 
can be made.  The Appendix  describes  the  method  used.  The resulting 
estimates  of the policy  impact of OBRA 1993 for fiscal years 1999-2003, 
expressed  as a share of GDP, are shown  in Figure 6, along  with  CBO's 
official estimates  for the period  1994-1998.20 
18. There  were two factors  that led to this result.  First,  the provisions  could be applied up 
to two years retroactively  at the discretion  of the taxpayer.  As a result, firms  whose 
past acquisitions  of intangible assets would benefit from the new provisions were 
induced to  settle court cases and pay  the  now  lower taxes due  on  these past 
transactions,  thereby speeding up tax payments but lowering them in present value. 
Second,  by shifting from a system under which some intangible  assets (i.e., goodwill) 
could not be amortized  at all and others were amortized  over short lifetimes to one 
under which most intangibles  were written off over 15 years, the legislation raised 
more revenue in the short run than the long run. See Gravelle (1993) for further 
discussion. 
19. The small immediate revenue loss estimated results from the assumption that some 
gains that otherwise  would have been realized  will be deferred  in order  to receive the 
tax cut. 
20. The lack of smoothness in the projected revenue and expenditure patterns in 1999 
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In Figure  6, the  revenue  increase  attributable to  OBRA 1993 clearly 
falls after 1998. The  magnitude  of  this  drop  amounts  to  about  $15-20 
billion  per year in 1994 dollars, which  is plausible  given  the magnitude 
of  the  various  speedup  provisions  reviewed  earlier and  the  crudeness 
of the calculation. However,  there is no such drop on the spending  side, 
where,  remarkably,  the  magnitude  of  the  projected  deficit  reduction 
continues  to grow,  not  simply  in absolute  terms but as a share of GDP 
-from  1.53% of GDP in fiscal year 1998 to 2.04% in 2003. A large part of 
this comes  from a projected  slowing  of Medicare growth  after 1998. 
Are  these  spending  forecasts  plausible?  In  addition  to  the  slower 
growth  of  Medicare,  they  include  the  prediction  (carried  over  from 
before  OBRA) that  discretionary  spending  will  continue  to  fall  after 
1998 as a share of GDP, from 6.9% to 6.3%-a  net reduction  of 2.5% of 
Figure 6 DEFICIT  REDUCTION,  RELATIVE  TO GDP (OBRA  1993) 
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GDP over the 10-year period beginning  in fiscal year 1993 and a drop of 
4.2% of GDP from fiscal year 1985. Whether  such continued  reductions 
are feasible  remains  to  be  seen.  However,  it is clear that  they  cannot 
continue  forever,  even  if  the  projections  through  2003  prove  to  be 
accurate. 
5. The  Sustainability  of Current  Fiscal  Policy 
Despite  the  persistence  of deficits in recent  years, many  observers  find 
reasons  for optimism  about  fiscal policy's  long-run  trajectory. After all, 
the  federal  deficit,  which  exceeded  5% of  GDP  for  each  year  of  the 
period  1983-1986  and  neared  this  level  again  in  the  early  1990s,  is 
projected  to  fall to  2.2% of  GDP by  1998. The  deficit  for 2003, which 
before  the  passage  of  OBRA was  projected  to  rise to  6.9% of  GDP, is 
now  forecast  to  rise  only  to  3.1%. Moreover,  the  primary  deficit  (the 
deficit excluding  net interest  paid), a key measure  for empirical tests of 
sustainability,  is  now  (in  fiscal  year  1994)  only  .4% of  GDP  and  is 
projected  to pass into surplus in fiscal year 1995 and stay there through 
2003. 
However,  longer-run  projections  do  not  support  optimistic  conclu- 
sions based on such short-run measures. There are two basic reasons for 
this.  One  is the  continuing  rapid  growth  of  government  medical  care 
expenditures.  The other is the shift of the social security system from its 
recent cash flow  surpluses  to significant cash flow deficits. Each of these 
changes  illustrates  the  difficulty  of  evaluating  sustainability  based  on 
the behavior  of current or past deficits, as empirical tests typically  have 
tried to do. 
5.1 SUSTAINABILITY  AND THE  INTERTEMPORAL 
BUDGET  CONSTRAINT 
Most  discussion  of  the  sustainability  of  fiscal  policy  begins  with  the 
presentation  of the  government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint, 
00 
B  +  E  (1  +  r)t-s-lDP  =  0,  (8) 
s=t 
where  Bt is the debt outstanding  at the beginning  of year  t, DPt is the 
primary  deficit  at the  end  of  year  t,  and  r  is  the  discount  rate. This 
constraint  is derived  simply  by  applying  the  annual  budget  constraint 
relating  Bt  and  B  tl  forward  successively  and  then  imposing  the 
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A policy  that  does  not  satisfy  this  terminal  condition  is not  sustain- 
able,  for  it  implies  that  the  debt  will  explode  at  a rate  faster  than  r. 
Hence,  one  strategy of testing  for sustainability, put simply, has been  to 
see  whether  the behavior  of  Bt over time has been  consistent  with  the 
terminal  condition  being  met-basically  whether  the  national  debt, 
given  its past time series properties, is predicted  to grow faster than the 
appropriate  discount  rate (see,  e.g.,  Hamilton  and  Flavin  1986; Wilcox 
1989). An intrinsic problem with  such tests, however,  is their reliance on 
past behavior  of the debt as a predictor of the future. This is a particular 
problem  now,  because  demographic  shifts  alter  the  level  and  growth 
rate of entitlement  spending. 
Moreover,  these  tests  are  very  susceptible  to  the  changes  in  the 
timing  of  deficits  so  easily  accomplished  by  policymakers  in  the  past. 
The underlying  hypothesis  being  tested  relates to the sum of the initial 
stock  of  debt  and  the  present  value  of  future  primary  deficits-the 
left-hand  side  of  Equation (8). But, without  changing  the  value  of this 
sum, it is very  easy  to change  Bt and  each annual  primary deficit and, 
hence,  the short-run behavior  of both  the debt and the deficit. 
The  problem  here  is  much  more  serious  than  needing  to  make 
corrections  for  "budget  gimmicks"  that  distort  the  "true"  pattern  of 
deficits.  As discussed  in  Section  3, there  are many  "legitimate"  policy 
changes  that  have  precisely  the  same  time  pattern  of  deficit  effects. 
There really is no  true pattern  of deficits, only  what  particular policies 
and conventions  define. 
For example,  replacing  the  social security  system  with  an actuarially 
fair public pension  system investing  in government  debt plus an old-age 
transfer program to the elderly  (to replicate the net transfers implicit in 
the  current social security  system)  would  have  no  effect on  the  sum  of 
the national  debt plus  the present  value  of future primary deficits-in- 
deed,  it  would  have  no  real  effects  at  all-but  it  would  raise  the 
national  debt immediately  by the stock of outstanding  unfunded  liabili- 
ties  of  the  social  security  system,  and  offset  the  surpluses  presently 
being  recorded  with  even  larger accumulating  liabilities to the working 
population.  Hence,  our conclusions,  not  only  about the level  of deficits 
but also about their trajectory, would  be strongly  affected. 
In  short,  while  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  is  well  defined, 
the  level  of any year's debt or deficit is not  (Kotlikoff, 1986). There are 
many  examples  from actual and proposed  legislation  of policies  that are 
essentially  equivalent  to one  another,  except  for their consequences  for 
the  timing  of measured  deficits.21 The only  solution  is to measure  the 
21. See Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  (1987)  and Auerbach,  Gokhale,  and Kotlikoff  (1991). 168 AUERBACH 
entire  left-hand  side  of Equation (8)-to  look  at projected  fiscal policy 
into the very  distant future.22 
5.2 LONG-RUN  FISCAL  PROJECTIONS 
To  evaluate  the  sustainability  of  fiscal  policy,  I  form  projections  of 
primary  federal  deficits  after 2004, the  last  fiscal year  for which  CBO 
estimates  exist. To highlight  the  importance  of entitlement  spending,  I 
assume-probably  optimistically,  given  the  low  level  of  discretionary 
spending  relative to GDP forecast for 2004-that  all noninterest  spend- 
ing other than Medicare, Medicaid, and OASDI (Social Security) remain 
constant  at their  projected  2004 shares  of  GDP, and  that  all revenues 
except  OASDI  payroll  taxes  do  so  as  well.  Hence,  I assume  primary 
deficits  as  a  share  of  GDP  grow  after 2004  exactly  to  the  extent  that 
Medicare plus Medicaid  and OASDI benefits  less payroll taxes do  so. 
For social  security  benefits,  I use  the  Social  Security  Trustees'  1993 
middle  ("Alternative  II") projections,  which  extend  through  the  year 
2070.23 For federal Medicare and Medicaid spending,24  I use the middle 
projections for real spending  through  the year 2030 made by the Health 
Care Financing  Administration  (HCFA) in  1991, the  most  recent  such 
projections  publicly  available.25 Between  2030 and  2070, I assume  that 
Medicaid  stays constant  as a share of GDP and that Medicare grows  at 
the  same rate as OASDI benefits.  This assumption  basically means  that 
post-2030  growth  in  federal  medical  costs  comes  from  demographic 
shifts-the  growing  share  of  elderly  in  the  population-rather  than 
changes  in the  relative  price of medical  care. After 2070, I assume  that 
OASDI, Medicare, and Medicaid  all grow  at the  same rate as GDP. 
These  projections,  along  with  those  resulting  for the  primary deficit, 
are shown  in  Figure  7. The  Social Security  system's  current cash  flow 
surpluses  are  projected  to  turn  to  deficits  by  2017,  which  continue 
growing  in  magnitude  thereafter.  The  swing  increases  the  primary 
22. Even this statement  is true only under the assumption,  which seems reasonable,  that 
satisfaction  of the terminal condition will not be influenced by changes in budget 
accounting  conventions. 
23. These projections  give taxes (income),  benefits  (outgo) and the balance  between taxes 
and benefits as a share of GDP every five years. I interpolate  to obtain  values for the 
years in between. 
24. Medicaid  spending financed by state governments  is excluded from the calculations. 
25. These are the same projections  used in the "Generational  Accounting"  calculations  of 
the federal budget during the past three fiscal years. See, e.g., OMB (1994).  Because 
the HCFA projections  for 2004, primarily  for Medicaid, differ from those currently 
offered  by CBO,  I benchmark  the 2004  numbers  to the CBO  projections  and adjust all 
subsequent years' HCFA  projections  by the same fraction of real GDP as the 2004 
adjustments  represent. The projections  for real GDP are based on CBO's assumed 
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deficit  by  1.7% of  GDP by  2030 and  2.3% by  2070. At  the  same  time, 
federal spending  on Medicare and Medicaid  is predicted  to continue  to 
grow faster than GDP through  2030, due to growth  in both the real cost 
of health  care and the ratio of beneficiaries  to the total population.  This 
growth  in medical  care spending  increases  the  primary deficit by 2.3% 
of  GDP between  2004 and  2030. After 2030, demographic  shifts  alone 
add another  .2% of GDP to the primary deficit. 
Together,  these  two  factors  are  projected  to  increase  the  primary 
deficit steadily  over the period from .2% of GDP in 2004 to 4.2% of GDP 
in  2030 and  5.0% by  2070. Indeed,  the  prospects  may  be  even  worse. 
These  calculations  incorporate  projections  for the growth  of real health 
care  spending  between  2004  and  2030  that  were  based  on  a  lower 
Figure 7 COMPONENTS  OF PRIMARY  DEFICITS  (RELATIVE  TO GDP) 
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assumed  rate of GDP growth  than the 2.3% assumed  here. In a sense,  I 
am assuming  that faster GDP growth  will  not lead  to faster growth  in 
Medicare  and  Medicaid.  If, instead,  I incorporate  the  original  projec- 
tions  of  Medicare  and  Medicaid  spending,  relative to  GDP,  through 
2030, the  result  will  be  faster growth  in  health  care entitlements  and 
primary deficits that are nearly 2% of GDP higher by 2030, as indicated 
by the upper  dashed  line in Figure 7. 
Even  if the  relative  price  of medical  care were  completely  stabilized 
in 2004, rather than in 203026 (as represented  by the lower  dashed  line 
in Fig. 7), the  primary deficit would  still grow  to 3.2% of GDP by 2030 
and 3.9% by 2070. 
5.3 ADDRESSING  THE  LONG-RUN  IMBALANCE 
With  primary  deficits  projected  to  grow  continually  over  the  next 
several  decades,  fiscal policy  is not  on  a sustainable  path.  These  large 
projected  primary  deficits,  in  combination  with  the  initial  stock  of 
outstanding  debt,  would  cause  the  full  deficit,  including  interest,  to 
grow  explosively  relative  to  GDP.  For example,  under  the  base  case 
projections  in Figure 7 and  a real interest  rate exceeding  the  real GDP 
growth  rate by  one  percentage  point,  the  debt-GDP  ratio would  grow 
from .55 in 2004 to  1.31 at the  end  of 2030 (the beginning  of 2031) and 
4.1 at the end  of 2070. For an inflation rate of 2.5%, this would  translate 
into  full nominal  deficits  rising  from 3.3% of GDP in 2004 to  11.5% of 
GDP in 2030 and 28.5% of GDP in 2070! 
One  way  of interpreting  an imbalance  of this magnitude  is in terms 
of the  immediate,  permanent  reduction  in the  primary deficit (brought 
about  through  tax increases  and/or  spending  reductions)  that, if pro- 
jections  prove  accurate, would  be needed  to bring the  debt-GDP  ratio 
at some  date  T in the future  down  to its level  at some  initial date  t, in 
this case 2004. This needed  reduction  in the  primary deficit, as a share 
of GDP, may be shown  to equal 
T  [l+r  T-s 
E  1  ds 1l+g 
)s=t(9)  A=(r-g)  bt  +(l+  r)  ( I +  r  _  T(t 
26.  For this simulation,  Medicaid  is held  constant  as a share of GDP at its projected  2004 
level, and Medicare is assumed  to grow  at the same rate as OASDI benefits starting in 
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where  g  is the  growth  rate of GDP and  d,  is the primary deficit-GDP 
ratio in year  s. 
As  discussed  in  Blanchard  et  al.  (1990),  a  terminal  date  of  T =  oo 
corresponds  to satisfying  the intertemporal budget  constraint (8). Given 
the projected  growth  of primary deficits between  2004 and 2070, hitting 
the  target  debt-GDP  ratio  at  some  intermediate  date  will  require  a 
lower  tax  increase  or  spending  cut  but  still  leave  the  job  partially 
unfinished. 
Table  3  presents  the  permanent  reductions  in  the  primary  deficits 
indicated  by this procedure,  for terminal dates of 2031, 2071, and oo,  for 
different  assumptions  about  medical  care spending  and  different  gov- 
ernment  discount  rates. As a comparison  of the upper  and lower  panels 
of Table 3 indicates,  a lower  interest  rate assumption  (with  the interest 
rate  exceeding  the  growth  rate  by  1% rather  than  2%) reduces  the 
needed  deficit reduction  for the  shortest  horizon  but  increases  it over 
the longest  horizon.  This is because,  in the short run, the lower  cost of 
servicing  the existing  debt dominates  the calculation  (see  Equation [9]). 
Over  the  longer  run, the  future  primary deficits dominate  the  calcula- 
tion, and, with  a lower  interest rate, those  far in the future-which  are 
larger as a share of GDP-matter  relatively  more. 
Even  under  the  more  optimistic  assumptions  about  the  growth  of 
Medicare and Medicaid, an immediate,  permanent  reduction  of nearly 4 
Table  3  PRIMARY  DEFICIT  REDUCTIONS  NEEDED  TO ACHIEVE 
2004 DEBT-GDP  RATIO  (PERCENT  OF GDP) 
Terminal  year  (%) 
2031  2071  oo 
Interest  rate 
Growth  rate + 2%: 
Base case  2.97  4.16  4.72 
Demographics  only  2.34  3.33  3.81 
Health care GDP-adjusted  3.60  5.32  6.07 
Growth  rate + 1%: 
Base case  2.52  3.88  4.80 
Demographics  only  1.86  3.01  3.81 
Health care GDP-adjusted  3.19  5.16  6.39 
Note: Simulations labeled "base case" incorporate HCFA's 1991 projections of the levels of real 
health care entitlement spending from 2004 to 2030; those labeled "demographics only" exclude 
those increases in Medicare estimated to result from increases in the relative price of health 
care; those labeled "health care GDP-adjusted"  base health care projections from 2004 to 2030 
on HCFA's original projections of health care entitlement spending as a share of GDP. These 
simulations show  faster health care spending growth than the base case because the original 
HCFA projections were based on lower real GDP growth rates than the 2.3% used in the base 
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percentage  points  in the  primary deficit-GDP  ratio is needed  to satisfy 
the intertemporal  budget  constraint (8) (i.e., for T =  oo).  The magnitude 
of this change  can be understood  by noting  that the  federal individual 
income  tax now  raises just over  8% of GDP. Hence,  individual  income 
taxes  would  need  to  be  raised  permanently  by  nearly  50%. Alterna- 
tively, OASDI benefits would  have to be cut permanently  by about 60%. 
5.4 WHAT  POLICY  CHANGES  ARE  NEEDED? 
A natural reaction by policymakers  is to dismiss pessimistic  calculations 
based  on  long-term  forecasts,  because  the  forecasts  involve  so  much 
uncertainty.  Indeed,  the bounds  on  long-run  projections  are wide.  For 
example,  the  Social Security Trustees' more  optimistic  ("Alternative  I") 
projections  show  the  OASDI  system  in  positive  balance  until  around 
2028 and back in positive  balance again about 10 years later. Under such 
projections,  even  with  no  change  in  the  medical  projections  through 
2030 or any of the other assumptions  made  earlier, the fiscal imbalance 
as measured  by A would  be  reduced  by  1.1% to  1.6% of GDP. On  the 
other  hand,  under  the  more  pessimistic  ("Alternative  III") Social Secu- 
rity projections,  A would  rise by  1.6% to 2.3% of GDP. But the  uncer- 
tainty  inherent  in  long-run  projections  doesn't  imply  that  no  policy 
actions  are  necessary  until  the  uncertainty  is  resolved,  merely  that 
further actions will be inevitable. 
The calculations  for T =  oo  made  at any particular date  t indicate  the 
magnitude  of  the  permanent  reduction  in  the  primary  deficit-GDP 
ratio,  say  At,  that  is  needed  for  currently  projected  fiscal  policy  to 
satisfy  the  government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint  (8).  Such  a 
change,  maintained  over  time,  will  actually  satisfy  Equation  (8)  if 
projections  at  date  t  prove  to  be  accurate.  In  general,  though,  a 
trajectory based  on  At  will  not  satisfy  Equation (8) in year  t +  1, once 
forecasts  are revised.  If one  assumes  that  forecast  revisions  cannot  be 
predicted,  the  process  At^,t+  A  t+2 ,...  will  thus  equal  a  random 
walk.  But  the  fact  that  At  will  change  does  not  alter the  fact  that  it 
represents  an  optimal  forecast  at date  t. At best  (given  recent  experi- 
ence), uncertainty  means that projected  deficits are as likely to rise as to 
fall. 
It is a separate issue how  the fiscal imbalance as estimated  at any date 
should  be addressed  over time. If tax rate changes  are used  to close the 
estimated  fiscal  gap,  the  simplest  tax-smoothing  arguments  derived 
from single-agent  models  (e.g., Barro, 1979) might be used  to support  a 
policy  of implementing  each period's  A immediately  and letting  the tax 
rate follow  a random  walk. 
In the real world,  a variety of complications  too numerous  to mention 
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to  induce  large,  frequent  changes  in  tax rates. In the  short  run,  other 
macroeconomic  concerns  may dominate  decisions.  Moreover, with  pop- 
ulation  heterogeneity  within  and  across  generations,  distributional 
concerns  must be  added  to arguments  based  on  minimizing  the  dead- 
weight  loss  of  taxation.  Once  this  is  done,  annual  patterns  of  deficit 
reduction  will  not  tell  us  enough  about  the  underlying  policy  being 
adopted,  for we  must  know  which  generations,  and which  individuals 
within  generations,  are bearing  each  year's  tax increases  or spending 
reductions.27  Here,  the  recently  developed  technique  of  generational 
accounting  (Auerbach  et  al.,  1991)  is  more  appropriate,  at  least  for 
evaluating  changes  in  fiscal  burdens  across  generations.  Put  simply, 
generational  accounting  considers  the  impact  on  different  generations 
of alternative ways  of satisfying  the government's  intertemporal budget 
constraint (8). 
Recent calculations  using  generational  accounting  (OMB, 1994, Table 
3.3)  are  very  sobering.  They  suggest  that,  should  the  tax  burden  of 
meeting  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  fall  entirely  on  future 
generations  (representing,  perhaps,  an unrealistic delay  given  the mag- 
nitude  of the imbalance), these  generations  will face tax burdens  (net of 
transfers) that are more than double what current policy would  indicate 
-an  increase  from 36% to  82% of  the  present  value  of  lifetime  labor 
income.28 
6. Conclusions 
The  U.S. federal  government  has  appeared  to reduce  deficits  mightily 
over the past decade  without  actually doing  so. Deficit forecasts during 
this period  have  proved  very inaccurate and overly  optimistic. There is 
no  simple  economic  explanation  for  such  errors, and,  while  political 
pressures  may have  played  a role, the exact mechanism  is not yet clear. 
The budget  rules of the period may have  hastened  legislators to act but 
were  poorly  designed  for the  purpose  of  restoring  fiscal balance.  The 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  Act  and,  particularly  the  1990 Budget  En- 
forcement  Act, impounded  forecasting  errors in  their  rules,  and  both 
permitted  the postponement  of serious action. 
27. Such disaggregate  analysis is also important  for understanding  the macroeconomic 
effects of deficits,  for the wealth effects of different  policies on household consump- 
tion will vary across  members  of particular  generations  and across  generations  as well. 
One recent attempt to consider the macroeconomic  effects of the large long-term 
deficits  looming in the next century  may be found in U.S. General  Accounting  Office 
(1992). 
28. These calculations  include state and local taxes and transfer  payments  as well as those 
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Even  with  the  passage  of  the  1993 Omnibus  Budget  Reconciliation 
Act, the United  States still faces a major fiscal imbalance, attributable to 
growing  health  care costs and changing  population  demographics.  This 
imbalance,  though  enormous,  is not  easily  identified  using  traditional 
methods  of evaluating  fiscal sustainability, because  it is not apparent  in 
the  projections  of  current  or near-term  deficits.  Even  if the  growth  of 
health  care costs were  stabilized  within  the next decade,  demographics 
alone would  still produce  large increases in the share of GDP accounted 
for by  Social Security  and  Medicare.  Yet, the  recent  CBO estimates  of 
the  impact  of  the  Clinton  health  plan  (CBO,  1994b),  which  project 
increased  near-term deficits, suggest  that health  care reform may  actu- 
ally worsen  the looming  fiscal imbalances reported  here. 
Appendix-Estimating  the Effects  of OBRA  1993 
for the Period  1998-2003 
This appendix  describes how  the changes  in deficits forecast by CBO for 
the period  1999-2003  from just before to just after the passage  of OBRA 
1993  are  divided  into  economic,  technical,  and  policy  revisions.  All 
calculations  apply  to the primary deficit, excluding  interest. 
I  begin  with  the  changes  in  the  deficits  forecast  for  fiscal  years 
1999-2003  in early 1993 (CBO, 1993a), before  OBRA 1993, and late 1993 
(CBO,  1993b), after  OBRA. I  assume  that  economic  changes  are  cap- 
tured entirely by changes  in the forecast of nominal  GDP. Specifically, I 
measure  as changes  due  to economic  factors those  changes  in revenues 
and  noninterest  spending  that  would  have  occurred  had  these  items 
been  held  constant  at their post-OBRA shares of nominal  GDP. Techni- 
cal  changes  are  more  difficult  to  guess,  but,  fortunately,  these  were 
quite small for the reported  years 1993-1998  during  this interval. Given 
this,  I simply  assume  that  the  technical  revisions  over  this  period  to 
estimated  1998 revenues  and  expenditures  also  apply  to  each  of  the 
years 1999 through  2003, as well. 
Subtraction  of  these  estimated  economic  and  technical  changes  in 
revenues  and  spending  yields  the  estimated  policy  effects presented  in 
Figure 6. 
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term budget  deficits  much  larger than  current  official projections.  His 
explicit  analysis  of  the  Social Security  and  Medicare  programs  implies 
that the longer-term  deficits will be an even  greater problem. 
The Auerbach analysis runs counter  to the conventional  wisdom  that 
now  prevails  in  both  Washington  and  the  financial  community.  The 
Congressional  Budget  Office (CBO), in  its most  recent  analysis  of  the 
budget  outlook  (CBO, 1994), projects that the deficit will fall to 2.4% of 
GDP in fiscal year  1995 and  will  still be  at that level  at the  end  of the 
decade.  Many  private  analysts  in  the  financial  community  are  even 
more optimistic. Even my old fellow  warrior in the fight against budget 
deficits, David  Stockman, has publicly predicted  that the deficit will fall 
to about  1.5% of GDP by end  of the  decade  (Wessel,  1994). 
I  nevertheless  find  Auerbach's  analysis  convincing.  Without  new 
policies,  I believe  that the  actual deficits later in the  decade  will exceed 
the projections  of the CBO and others. 
One  reason  for this apparent  difference  of opinion  is that those  who 
are  optimistic  about  future  deficit  levels  are  assuming,  explicitly  or 
implicitly, that new  policies  will be adopted  to achieve  the lower  deficit 
levels.  The CBO explicitly  assumes  "compliance  with  the  discretionary 
spending  caps," an  assumption  that I believe  is unlikely  without  new 
legislative  actions. Stockman explains  that his optimism  is based  on the 
assumption  that  the  increase  in  health  care  spending  will  decline 
because  Congress  will  enact  new  limits  on  future  health  spending  by 
the  government.  Although  such  favorable  legislation  may  occur,  they 
are far from a certainty. Indeed,  senior administration  officials have  said 
that  they  believe  that  they  have  done  enough  to  reduce  the  future 
deficits and that now  any new  initiatives  that result in lower  projected 
outlays  will be used  to finance new  spending  programs, a strategy that 
the administration  has labeled  "cut and spend." 
There is a danger that the projections  of declining  deficits will induce 
a  complacency  about  budget  policy.  Although  budget  analysts  may 
understand  that more  must be  done  to achieve  their optimistic  projec- 
tions,  the  public  and  the  political  process  will  assume  the  opposite. 
Auerbach's  analysis,  therefore,  is a healthy  reminder  that the  problem 
should  not be ignored. 
In my  comments  I will  focus  on  the medium-term  fiscal outlook  and 
will  discuss  some  additional  reasons  why  the budget  deficit is likely  to 
be  substantially  higher  than  projected  during  the  final  years  of  this 
decade  unless  new  measures  are taken. Thus, these  remarks are in part 
a supplement  to what Auerbach has told us about the previous biases in 
deficit projections  and  in part an indication  of additional  budget  prob- 
lems that are likely  to develop  in the next several years. Comment 177 
1. Economic  Assumptions  and the Budget  Outlook 
The CBO projects that the deficit will decline  from 4.9% of GDP in 1992 
to  2.3% of  GDP five  years  later. The  majority  of  this  sharp  decline  is 
due,  however,  to a projection  that the  economic  recovery  will  take the 
unemployment  rate from 7.4% to 5.8% (using  the  unemployment  rate 
definitions  that  prevailed  before  1994). The  standardized  employment 
deficit only  falls by  1.2% of GDP. If the  unemployment  rate cannot  be 
sustained  at a low  5.8%, the budget  deficit will be higher. 
That is a doubly optimistic assumption.  An unemployment  rate below 
6.0% may  be  unsustainable,  resulting  in  a cumulatively  rising  rate  of 
inflation.  But even  if a 5.8% unemployment  rate could  in  principle  be 
sustained  without  raising  inflation,  it  would  be  very  optimistic  to 
assume  that  the  economy  would  always  operate  at this  "full  employ- 
ment" level.  Even a relatively  optimistic benchmark of 6.1% would  add 
about $15 billion  to the annual  deficit. 
A second  source  of  the  decline  in  the  deficit  is the  assumption  that 
the  average  interest  rate  on  the  outstanding  government  debt  will 
decline.  This reflects the CBO's explicit assumption  that the interest rate 
on 10-year Treasury notes  will be only 5.8% in 1994 and will only rise to 
6.2% in 1997. In fact, however,  the 10-year Treasury rate is already 7.0% 
and  the  upward  sloping  yield  curve  implies  that  it  will  rise  in  the 
future.  The  CBO's assumption  that  the  three-month  Treasury bill rate 
will  only  rise to 4.6% in  1997 is also contrary to market evidence  that 
implies  that  short-term  rates  will  exceed  7.0% in  1997. The  impact  of 
substituting  the  future  interest  rates indicated  by  today's  market  data 
for the  more  optimistic  CBO forecasts  would  add  about  $30 billion  to 
the  1997 deficit outlook. 
In short, more plausible  economic  assumptions  would  add about $45 
billion  to  the  projected  1997 budget  deficit, an increase  equal  to about 
0.6% of GDP. This alone  would  raise the projected  deficit from 2.3% of 
GDP to 2.9% of GDP. 
2. Overstated  Tax  Revenue 
A  major  source  of  the  projected  deficit  reduction  is  the  additional 
revenue  that is supposed  to result from raising tax rates on high-income 
individuals.  The  CBO projected  that  by  1997 the  additional  revenue 
from the higher  tax rates will be $25 billion1 (CBO, 1993). 
1. Unfortunately, the CBO does not make an independent estimate of the effect of 
changes in tax rules but simply incorporates  the estimates  provided by the staff  of the 
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This estimate  is likely  to be  a great  overstatement  of  the  additional 
tax  revenue  that  will  actually  be  collected.  The  1993  tax  legislation 
raised  the  marginal  tax  rate  from  31% to  38.9% for  taxpayers  with 
incomes  over  $140,000 and  from 31% to 42.5% for those  with  incomes 
over $250,000. Such large increases  in marginal tax rates, combined  for 
most  of  the  affected  taxpayers  with  relatively  little  increase  in  the 
average  tax  rate,  are  likely  to  cause  changes  in  behavior  that  reduce 
taxable  income  and,  therefore,  that  cause  the  revenue  to  be  substan- 
tially less than it would  be with  no behavioral  response.  These  changes 
include  not  only  a reduction  in  labor supply  but  also  changes  in  the 
form of compensation,  portfolio  adjustments,  and increased  deductions. 
Because  of the  structure of the tax increase,  a relatively  small behav- 
ioral response  can eliminate  much  of the revenue  gain that would  have 
occurred  in  the  absence  of  the  behavioral  response.  Consider,  e.g.,  a 
taxpayer  with  taxable  income  of  $180,000,  approximately  the  median 
level  of income  among  those  whose  taxes were  increased  by  the  1993 
legislation.  With  no  behavioral  response,  the  higher  tax  rates  would 
raise  that  taxpayer's  liability  by  $3,305.  But  if  the  increase  in  the 
marginal  tax rate from 31% to 38.9% caused  a 5% reduction  in taxable 
income  (from $180,000 to $171,000), the Treasury would  actually collect 
$196 less from that taxpayer at the new  rates than at the previous  lower 
rates.  The  official  estimates  of  the  increased  revenue  and  resulting 
deficit  reduction  fail to  make  an  adequate  allowance  for these  behav- 
ioral responses. 
I  recently  completed  a  very  detailed  analysis  of  the  response  of 
high-income  taxpayers  to  the  1986 tax  rate  reductions.  That  analysis 
used  a panel  of  individual  tax returns  provided  by  the  Internal  Rev- 
enue  Service that allows  following  the taxable income  of individuals  for 
several  years  before  and  after  the  tax  change  (Feldstein,  1993a). The 
behavioral  response  estimated  in  that  study  implies  that  the  1993 
increases  in tax rates for high-income  individuals  would  raise approxi- 
mately $4.5 billion in 1997 instead  of the $25 billion incorporated  in the 
CBO  budget  deficit  projections,  implying  an  annual  shortfall  of  $20 
billion. 
3. Implausible  Reductions  in Spending 
On the spending  side of the budget,  there are no significant reductions 
or eliminations  of domestic  spending  programs. Indeed,  the  1993 bud- 
get includes  substantial new  spending  for a variety  of social programs. Comment 179 
The  CBO nevertheless  projects  large  overall  spending  cuts  because  it 
assumes  very  large  reductions  in  defense  spending  and  very  large 
savings  through  the  improved  management  of  existing  programs.  In 
projecting  these  savings,  however,  the  CBO is explicit  that it does  not 
necessarily  believe  that they  will occur! The CBO makes very clear that 
its  deficit  projections  simply  assume  that  the  overall  limits  on  discre- 
tionary  spending  that  Congress  previously  enacted  will  somehow  be 
effective.  This  may  not  be  a  plausible  assumption,  but  the  CBO  is 
required  to  estimate  what  the  existing  law  implies  about  the  future 
budget  deficit  and  not  to  project  how  it  thinks  legislation  might  de- 
velop  in the future. 
The  projected  cuts  in  defense  spending  are  the  primary  source  of 
reduced  outlays.  The  administration  projects  that real defense  outlays 
in 1997 will be 25% lower  than in 1993, an annual  saving  of $82 billion. 
This would  reduce  defense  spending  to only  3.2% of GDP, the  lowest 
level  in  more  than  50 years.  Even  the  real dollar amount  of  spending 
projected  for  1997  would  be  nearly  20%  lower  than  real  defense 
spending  in the early 1960s. 
One  can  only  wonder  whether  with  all  of  the  turmoil  around  the 
world-including  NATO  activity  in  the  former  Yugoslavia,  a  nuclear 
threat from North  Korea, fighting  in the republics of the former Soviet 
Union,  and the ongoing  tension  with Iraq-such  dramatic reductions  in 
defense  spending  are likely to occur. If real defense  outlays  are reduced 
by 15% rather than 25%, the budget  deficit in 1997 would  be $33 billion 
higher. 
Improvements  in  management  efficiency  are  an  admirable  goal  of 
every  administration.  They are an important part of the Clinton admin- 
istration's  strategy  for keeping  aggregate  spending  under  the  ceilings 
that  the  CBO  assumes.  Of  course,  such  savings  might  occur.  But  it 
would  be very  optimistic at this time to assume  that the very ambitious 
targets  of  more  than  $40 billion  a year  will  be  achieved.  Even  a 50% 
success  rate would  be a substantial achievement.  But it would  leave  the 
1997 deficit $20 billion larger than the CBO projects. 
4.  Technical  Errors  and Policy  Changes 
In his analysis  of past deficit projection errors, Alan Auerbach appropri- 
ately  emphasizes  the  distinction  between  technical  errors and  policy 
changes.  In  that  terminology,  the  incorrect  assumptions  about  the 
future  state  of  the  economy  and  the  level  of  interest  rates  would  be 180 *  FELDSTEIN 
classified  as  technical  errors.  So,  too,  would  the  overestimate  of  tax 
revenue  caused  by a failure to reflect behavioral  responses  adequately. 
My estimates  suggest  that these  three  sources  of technical  error would 
add about $65 billion to the budget  deficit in 1997, approximately  1% of 
GDP. 
Although  that may seem like an implausibly  large technical error, it is 
only  about  half  of  the  average  technical  error during  the  fiscal years 
1990 through  1993, the only years for which  adequate  data are available 
for making  the  comparison.  Auerbach  reports  that  the  technical  error 
averaged  $132  billion  a  year  for  fiscal  years  1990  through  1993,  an 
average  of more than 2% of GDP. If recent history is a good  guide,  the 
technical  errors will be twice  as large as the ones  that I have  identified. 
A failure to cut  1997 defense  spending  by $75 billion  and to achieve 
annual  management  savings  of $40 billion would  violate  the previously 
legislated  ceilings  on  discretionary  spending.  These  would  be classified 
as policy  changes  rather than technical  errors. My judgment  is that the 
legislation  necessary  to  accommodate  these  changes  will  be  enacted, 
adding  perhaps  an additional  $50 billion to the  1997 deficit. 
Other  policy  changes  may  also occur that add  to the  future  deficits. 
The  existing  law  permits  spending  for "emergencies"  outside  the  dis- 
cretionary  spending  limits,  and  that  feature  was  used  in  connection 
with  the government's  assistance  after the California earthquake. Other 
emergencies  will no  doubt  occur in the future. 
Many  of  the  health  care  proposals  would,  if  enacted,  cause  actual 
spending  increases  that  far exceed  their  officially  estimated  costs  and 
would  also cause  substantial revenue  losses  that are not reflected  at all 
in the cost estimates  for those  programs (Feldstein,  1993b). 
5. Concluding  Thoughts 
The combination  of $65 billion a year of technical  errors and $50 billion 
a year of "policy  changes"  does  not seem unduly  pessimistic  in light of 
either past experience  or the current analysis. A $115 billion addition  to 
the  1997 deficit  would  represent  a  smaller  forecasting  error than  the 
average  of the past several years that Auerbach has calculated. But $115 
billion a year of additional  deficit would  raise the total deficit to 3.9% of 
GDP. The  ratio  of  national  debt  to  GDP would  still be  rising.  Unless 
there  is  a  rise  in  private  saving,  the  federal  government  would  be 
borrowing  more  than  75% of  all  private  saving,  leaving  the  country 
with  net  savings  of  less  than  2%  of  GDP  with  which  to  finance 
investment  in plant  and equipment  and housing. Comment  -181 
It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  different  policy  changes  will  cause 
reductions  in  spending  that  are not  currently  contemplated.  Perhaps 
Alan  Auerbach's  sobering  pessimism  about  the  medium  term  deficit 
outlook  and  his  cries of  alarm about  the  impossible  financing  require- 
ments  of  our  social  insurance  programs  in  the  longer  run  will  cause 
politicians  to  act  quickly  to  reduce  future  deficits.  But  this  seems 
unlikely,  especially  given  the administration's  "cut and spend"  strategy 
that would  use  any projected  outlay  reductions  to finance  new  spend- 
ing  programs. I worry  that politicians  are optimists  by nature and  that 
only the experience  of rising budget  deficits will cause them to take the 
steps necessary  to reverse the process. If so, things will get worse before 
they  get better. 
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Comment 
V. V. CHARI 
Northwestern  University 
I have  to  say  that  I have  decidedly  mixed  feelings  about  this  paper.  I 
love it as a reader: It is a gripping mystery story. A series of great crimes 
has been  committed  over  the  past  15 years, and  the hunt  is on  for the 
criminals. I hate  it as a discussant.  How  do  you  discuss  a paper  when 
you  agree  with  every  single  thing  in it? So rather than  take the  usual 
role  of  a discussant  (which  is to  prove  that  you  are smarter than  the 
author), I think it useful  to recapitulate  what  I learned  from the paper. 
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The paper is  organized around five questions (and five answers). 
These are 
1. What is the current  path of policy? (Disastrous.) 
2. What is the likely impact of the Clinton economic program?  (Who 
knows?) 
3. Is the fiscal trajectory  sustainable?  (No.) 
4. Why have  past attempts at  deficit reduction not  worked? (Who 
knows?) 
5. How  have congressional rules affected policy? (As a great smoke 
screen.) 
The questions are interesting in  their own  right, but the  answers 
require a coherent intellectual framework.  That is, they require us to 
use economic theory. Let me begin with the sense in which current 
policy is disastrous. There are two senses in which one can say this: 
Current  and projected policy is unsustainable  in the sense of violating 
the government's budget constraint, or such policy is undesirable. I 
think the sustainability  question is overblown. As long as the market 
continues to buy government debt, unsustainable  policy simply means 
that the market's expectations of future policy are different from the 
analysts'.  This is not to say that the exercise is without merit since it is 
worthwhile  to  ask what  alternative policies should be  chosen  if  a 
particular  policy is infeasible. The undesirability  or suboptimality  rela- 
tive to some welfare criterion is a much more interesting issue. Here, 
received economic theory gives us useful guidance on the properties  of 
good fiscal policy over time and across states of nature. For now, I will 
restrict  myself to the implications  of models with distorting taxes (as in 
Barro  [1979],  Lucas and Stokey [1983],  or Chari, Christiano,  and Kehoe 
[1993]).  In thinking about how these models can guide us, start with a 
fundamental premise: We  have  not  abolished war. We  confidently 
expect that sometime in the future, large expenditures on defense will 
be necessary. Given this premise, models in which governments design 
policies to smooth tax distortions instruct us that, if state-contingent 
debt is available,  the debt/GDP ratios  should not rise in peacetime,  and, 
indeed, they should fall in times of relative prosperity.  If such state-con- 
tingent debt is not available,  debt/GDP ratios should fall in peacetime. 
All this is, or should be, common sense. The disturbing aspect of the 
fiscal policy numbers that Auerbach reports is not that the debt/GDP 
ratio rose in the 1980s  (after  all, we were in the midst of a cold war);  it is 
that it continued to rise in the early 1990s and, toward the end of the 
decade, is projected to rise fairly sharply under current policy. This is Comment  183 
clearly undesirable.  Simple considerations  of optimal fiscal policy  tell us 
that  policy  should  change  and  that  planning  for such  change  should 
begin  now. 
It is here that Auerbach's contribution  is the greatest. For, in thinking 
about  proposed  changes,  it  is  worth  asking  why  large  past  changes 
have  had such  disappointing  results. Auerbach documents  the sense  in 
which  the  CBO  has  produced  forecasts  of  budget  deficits  that  have 
proved  to be consistently  low. Essentially, the CBO's model  for forecast- 
ing the deficit is given  by two  equations: 
DEFt =  Po +  P,(MACRO),  +  2(POLICY), +  Et  (1) 
(MACRO),  =  -o  +  -y(POLICY),  +  qt,  (2) 
where  DEF  denotes  the  deficit,  MACRO  is  a  vector  of  current  and 
lagged  macroeconomic  variables,  POLICY is  a  vector  of  current  and 
lagged  policy  variables,  and  e  and  q  are  residuals.  The  interesting 
observation  from Auerbach's paper is that, even  after the actual macro- 
economic  and  policy  variables  that  were  realized  are  substituted 
into  Equation  (1), the  residual  Et  was  consistently  large  and  positive. 
Auerbach  does  not  tell  us  why  there  might  be  a bias, but  let  me  try. 
Think of congressional  committees  and  other  decision  makers facing  a 
constraint on their policies: that future deficits as projected by the CBO 
must meet certain targets. (This constraint was either explicit or implicit 
during  most  of  the  last  15 years.)  Assume  also  that  the.policies  most 
preferred  by  Congress  if  the  deficit  is  not  a  constraint  imply  large 
deficits  over,  say,  a  five-year  horizon  under  the  "true"  model  of  the 
economy.  Now  think  of Congress  as offering  the  CBO several versions 
of policies.  Say policy  A implies  a larger deficit than policy  B under  the 
"true"  model  but  the  same  deficits  under  the  CBO's model  (due  to 
specification  error, e.g.). Clearly, Congress will choose  A over B, and the 
CBO's forecasts  will  seem  to be  biased.  Note  that  this  argument  does 
not  require  that  Congress  know  the  "true"  model  or that  the  CBO's 
model  be systematically  biased.  Rather, the result comes  from a reason- 
ing  similar to that in the "winner's  curse" in auctions. 
One  implication  of this argument  is that Congress  should  recognize 
this sort of bias and impose  stricter limits on deficit projections from the 
CBO's model.  Imposing  such stricter future limits, though,  is not partic- 
ularly helpful  unless  Congress  is willing  to abide by  them  and  unwill- 
ing to engage  in the kind of game playing  that Auerbach documents  so 
well.  All this leaves  me,  as it seems  to have  left Auerbach, in a state of 184 *  DISCUSSION 
despair. The more interesting  remedy  is to understand  how  the institu- 
tional  rules  of  policymaking  in  Congress  have  affected  outcomes.  For 
example, congressional  subcommittees  have proliferated over the last 30 
years.  The  power  of  the  congressional  leadership  and  the  president 
have  clearly declined  relative  to  that of the  rank and  file in Congress. 
My guess is that when  we understand  the political economy  of Congress 
we  will  come  up  with  better  reforms than  the  alphabet  soup  of GRH, 
BEA, OBRA, et al. It may  seem  like a cop-out  to call for more research, 
but what  else  are economic  theorists  to  do  when  confronted  with  the 
evidence  Auerbach has so carefully gathered? 
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Discussion 
Olivier Blanchard remarked that the  results of the paper would  proba- 
bly look much  different for the pre-1980 period,  when  the deficits were 
much  smaller  and  did  not  increase.  He  asked  what  had  happened 
during  the  1980s that  would  explain  the  size  and  persistence  of  the 
deficits. Blanchard suggested  that one  explanation  might  be the  index- 
ing  of  the  tax brackets  to  inflation.  Feldstein  agreed  with  Blanchard, 
noting  that the high inflation of the 1970s pushed  taxpayers into higher 
brackets  and  led  to  higher  revenues  than  expected.  This  source  of 
revenue  disappeared  with  the  indexation  of  the  tax system.  Auerbach 
and  Robert Gordon  said  that  the  regime  shift  came  with  Reagan  and 
the  supply-siders  in  1981,  who  exploited  the  intertemporal  budget 
constraint.  They  added  that returning  to the  old  regime  where  spend- 
ing was paid for by taxes is likely to be difficult. V. V. Chari agreed that 
Reagan was  a proximate cause but speculated  that another  explanation 
lay in congressional  reforms in the mid-1970s. 
James  Tobin  pointed  out  that  deficit  reduction  may  not  always 
increase  national  savings  and  investment  but  could  go  into  higher 
unemployment  or else  decrease  some  public  investment,  which  might 
be  as useful  as the  private  investment  that is potentially  crowded  out. 
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Tobin  also  noted  that  despite  the  high  proportion  of  national  net 
savings  taken  up  by  the budget  deficit and  the  resulting  low  levels  of 
net  investment,  productivity  growth  has  been  surprisingly  high.  One 
possible  explanation  is  that  it  is  gross  investment  that  has  improved 
productivity  by  introducing  more  recent  vintages  of  capital.  Robert 
Gordon agreed  that productivity  growth  was surprisingly  high,  and he 
suggested  that perhaps  the  economy  is getting  more productivity  than 
before  out  of each  dollar of investment  and, therefore,  doesn't  need  as 
much  investment.  He  noted  that  this  appears  to  be  the  case  with 
foreign  investment,  where  the  United  States is a net  debtor, but  has a 
positive  net  foreign  investment  position.  Gordon  also  cited  work  by 
Greg Mankiw  that shows  that less  housing  investment  will  be needed 
in the future due  to lower  household  formation. 
In  response,  Auerbach  said  that  an  additional  concern  about  high 
deficits  was  their intergenerational  burden.  Even  in an open-economy 
setting where  crowding  out is less of an issue, the high debt will impose 
higher  tax  burdens  or  lower  benefits  for  future  generations.  This  is 
unlikely  to  represent  an  optimal  fiscal policy,  according  to  Auerbach, 
because  of  the  efficiency  losses  from  the  higher  future  marginal  tax 
rates or because  of the intergenerational  redistribution  effects. 
David  Wilcox  asked  what  the  path  of  the  deficit  would  have  been 
without  the budget  rules. Presumably,  some  projects were  dropped  or 
cut back  as  a result  of  the  rules.  Auerbach  agreed  that  the  rules  had 
some  real  effects,  but  he  noted  that  there  was  also  an  erosion  of  the 
accounting  measure  of  the  deficit,  through  the  strategic  timing  of  tax 
collections,  e.g.  In  addition,  Auerbach  pointed  out  that  the 
Gramm-Rudman  and  the  1990 Budget  Accord were  both  accompanied 
by  contemporaneous  deficit  reduction  packages,  which  presumably 
should  not be attributed to the rules. 
Laurence Meyer thought  that it was  inappropriate  to group  together 
the  1990 budget  accord  and  Gramm-Rudman.  In  his  view,  the  1990 
budget  accord  was  an  improvement  in  fiscal  discipline,  while 
Gramm-Rudman  was  unworkable  because  its targets  were  unrealistic 
and  did not  take into  account  cyclical movements  in the deficit. Meyer 
also suggested  that more attention  could have been  focused  on whether 
the  failure  to  meet  the  1990  budget  accord  targets  was  due  to  an 
endogenous  labor supply  or investment  response.  He noted  that this is 
a crucial question  in predicting  the effect of the most recent tax act. 
Several  people  took  issue  with  the  pessimistic  tone  of  the  paper. 
Meyer  said  that  the  deficit  was  currently  on  a  downward  path  and 
pointed  out that the CBO forecasts of the deficit were  generally  higher 
than  most  private  forecasts.  He  acknowledged  that  more  adjustment 186 *  DISCUSSION 
would  be  needed  to lower  the  deficit  after 1997-1998,  but  he  thought 
that this was  well  understood  in Washington.  Nouiel  Roubini thought 
that the adjustments  required to lower  the deficits after 1997-1998  were 
not  so  severe.  He  noted  that  under  some  scenarios  discussed  in  the 
paper, it looked  as though  an adjustment  of about 2% of GDP would  be 
enough  to  stabilize  the  debt/GDP  ratio forever.  Auerbach  responded 
by pointing  out that the difference between  the long-run  and short-run 
scenarios  illustrates the point  that an annual  or even  five-year measure 
of the  deficit was  an inappropriate  indicator  of fiscal policy.  The prob- 
lem,  he  suggested,  was  more  complicated  than  simply  correcting  for 
accounting  policies  that  alter the  timing  of  deficits,  such  as  a  sale  of 
government  assets.  As discussed  in  the  paper,  there  are many  "legiti- 
mate" tax policies  that have  exactly  the  same  timing  effect as an asset 
sale. 